White Biocentrism

The Kosher Food Tax: Debunking the Debunkers (Part I)

Karl Radl

The Kosher Food Tax is the kind of argument that someone who is skeptically inclined; like myself, tends to just assume is wrong and that can be debunked by a little research. Indeed my position on the Kosher Food Tax has for a long-time been that I couldn't credit it based on what arguments for it that I had read. This was until I began reading a little more in and around the issue of kashrut in Judaism.

The arguments usually offered; in my continued estimation of them, are still poor, but I have subsequently revised my opinion of the counter-arguments as well in that they are actually worse than the positive arguments for the existence of a Kosher Food Tax.

The problem has really been that those arguing the Kosher Food Tax case; both for and against, tend to be either jewish (who aren't exactly likely to admit the truth of such a claim regardless of evidence) and/or have evinced little understanding of what the rulings of kashrut require and what; concomitantly, the standards used are.

This article is not intended to be exhaustive as that requires a lot more detailed work and the use of case studies: however I will endeavour to show in summary that the Kosher Food Tax quite probably does exist albeit in a different way than is usually envisioned by both proponents and detractors.

I should also note that there is a remarkable dearth of literature on this subject (1) and most of what there is takes the form of small pamphlets or short articles on the internet. This is unfortunate but it is somewhat understandable given that arguments on both sides of the fence are poorly defined and don't really prove their case.

This chimes with one writer on Yahoo who asserted that she had come across the Kosher Food Tax in her research on Matt Hale and World Church of the Creator: (2) although the writer does make the amusingly illogical assertion that; because Hale couldn't name the cost of a kashrut certification inspection on the spot, the whole argument is somehow bogus.

This assertion on the part of the writer of the Yahoo article leads us nicely into perhaps the most important issue to comprehend in regards to the Kosher Food Tax: the arguments made for and against it are very confused.

The first issue that needs to be brought out is the fact that a staple of the opposing argument turns upon the name given to this theory: the Kosher Food Tax. Or more specifically that what is argued is that there is a secret jewish world government that is operating this tax (3) and that because what is argued is per se a commercial/marketing expense then it isn't actually a tax in the first place. (4)

Now the problem here is that in the first instance the arguments made about the Kosher Food Tax do not require or even suppose the existence of a proverbial secret jewish world government. For example Ed Fields in his 'The Truth at Last' article on this subject; which the ADL article on the subject takes as the definitive statement in favour of the argument, (5) doesn't actually assert there is a secret jewish world government hoarding or using all this money.

All Fields asserts is that the World Jewish Congress; which the author of the Yahoo article probably took literally as opposed to figuratively and the ADL just misrepresented as tends to be their want, gets a cut of some of the money from the Orthodox Union fees specifically. (6) Fields does not assert or imply that this (Zionist) organisation is a governing body of jewry: what he asserts; on what evidence he does not state, is simply that the World Jewish Congress gets some of the money that the Orthodox Union makes (and reasonably presumes some of this is from its kashrut certification operation).

The issue of donations and the use of this money by kosher certification organisations I shall deal with later in this article as it is another double-edged sword that jewish organisations and the less skeptical have sought to use against proponents of the theory, but only expose their lack of research and/or their intellectual agenda.

In addition Rabbi Yaakov Luban; like the ADL, seeks to place the argument for the existence of a Kosher Food Tax within a negative anti-Semitic paradigm, but in doing so he exposes his agenda; if that were already not evident enough from his employment with the Orthodox Union, in that it is simply irrelevant to the theory's factual or counter-factual nature if the charge is anti-Semitic or whether it is not. (7)

After all anti-Semitism is not saying anything critical of jews or Judaism; as that would ipso facto render even the most fanatical Zionist jews as anti-Semites and therefore 'self-hating jews', but rather opposition to the jews as a national (i.e. biological) group. (8) The charge that the jews are making money out of kashrut certification and that this charge is paid largely by non-jews is not even anti-Judaism in that although it criticises Judaism (and not jews in the national sense) the argument is far broader and can be made in relation to the rise of Halal certification as well.

If we understand then that the charge is made more against a minority religious practice, which affects the majority without the latter being informed about it and that does not necessarily criticise jews alone but also other groups who are currently largely opposed to jews such as Muslims. We can see that the knee jerk claim of those seeking to discredit the existence of a proverbial kosher food tax that implicit in their frequent claim that such a tax is rendered meaningless as it is a normal commercial expense (9) is just that: an emotional and irrational counterargument.

To simplify slightly: if; as the self-styled 'debunkers' claim, arguing for the existence of a proverbial kosher food tax is anti-Semitic then it renders their own argument suspect, because they have not taken the time to understand that the argument is being made not against the jews per se, but rather against a wider practice of charged religious certification without the assent or knowledge of those not of that group. Thus the fact that the so-called 'debunkers' do not consider the possibility that Muslims also do the same thing (i.e. halal certification for a charge) and then label the charge as one that is 'anti-Semitic' tells us that either they have not done any research on the matter and/or they have an agenda which is served by seeing an attack on a practice; which the jews are the best and most widespread example of, being an attack on the jews as a national group (i.e. being anti-Semitic).

In essence then the charge of anti-Semitism against the kosher food tax cannot hold, because it is clearly a knee jerk claim based on a desire to discredit the proponent of the reform of religious certification as opposed to being one that can be objectively verified.

This statement can further evidenced by the sort of absolute rhetorical nonsense spouted by 'debunkers' such as:

'Those spouting about a Jewish tax on food are consumed by hatred and want to incite others to feel the same way.' (10)

We can clearly see here that the 'debunker' is not objective or even interested in the factual or fictional nature of the proposition and is out to smear those who argue the kosher food tax thesis as 'irrational haters'. That someone can have a brain and has come to oppose the jews through studying them doesn't even enter the heads of such individuals as a possibility.

Having dispensed with this bit of knee jerk nonsense from the jews on this subject we can move to a more substantial issue that has been touched on above: the claim that the cost of certification is a normal marketing expense.

To quote the Boycott Watch article:

'Third, in many cases, the certifications are requested by the marketing departments of the food manufacturers. This is because in most cases the kosher certification builds sales, thus lowering the average per item manufacturing cost, resulting in higher sales and profit for the manufacturer.' (11)

This is alternatively stated at the 'Kosher Food' blog as:

'Food companies advertise and that is an expense for the purpose of finding new and repeat business. That is a good thing. Advertising for new and repeat business is good for the customers because it can mean more information to the public and lower prices. A kosher label is a form of direct advertising telling the customer this food is kosher and meets biblical standards in how it was prepared and what foods are used. This too is a good thing, because food companies wouldn't do this if it didn't make business sense and mean an increase in profit.' (12)

This sounds like a strong argument doesn't it?

However take a closer look and the argument begins to fall apart.

Now firstly it is stated by the Boycott Watch article that kashrut certification is requested by the marketing department of an organisation: this is true in many cases. However it highlights a fundamental error that occurs in nearly all 'debunker' literature, which is to assume; for no rational reason, that the only companies or organisations affected by kashrut certification are large ones whether they be nationals or multinationals.

Nowhere do the 'debunkers'; and most guilty of all is the ADL article (the error from which most others of this type appear to stem), (13) consider the effect of kosher certification on SMEs (Small-Medium Enterprises) or on owner-proprietor firms, which are (or in some cases should be) the basis of the part of the Kosher Food Tax theory that states that the costs are passed on the consumer.

This lack of wider consideration also collapses the 'debunker' argument that the 'cost is minuscule' and not passed onto the customers as while this would likely be true of a large organisation; such as HJ Heinz Company, who have the ability to absorb the not inconsiderable costs of kosher certification as just another sales/marketing cost.

However this would not always; or even in most instances, be the case with smaller organisations and as kashrut certification affects restaurants/eateries as well as food manufacturers. Clearly then the cost is not 'minuscule' to many; if not most, certified firms, but would be only to the large firms that the ADL article cites in the context of their balance sheets.

We may further mention that the cost of certification calculation cited by the ADL is quite deliberately misleading in that it states that the cost is so much per unit: however this calculation comes from a large company using only one; which we should particularly note, of its best known brands (General Foods' brand 'Birds Eye' in 1975) (14) and does not factor in the amount of units produced or any economies of scale that have taken place.

So in laymen's terms the figure produced by the ADL; of $0.0000065 per unit, is meaningless, because we do not know the total number of units that this is being derived from. Now I have been unable to find the scale of total sales for or the number of units produced by Birds Eye globally.

However for the sake of argument if we take the US sales of Birds Eye in 1980 (I have not been able to locate 1975's data), which were significantly less than in the early-mid 1970s when Birds Eye was at its commercial peak, of $357.6 million (15) and multiply by the amount that ADL article cites as the cost per unit ($0.0000065) then we get the seemingly small figure of $2324.40 as the kashrut certification charge.

This seems small doesn't it? However bear in mind that the value of the dollar has changed considerably in the intervening period (i.e. 1975 to 2012) and if we adjust for inflation alone we get an approximate value of $10,000.

Now $10,000 for a simple inspection; which is after all how the 'debunkers' style it, is rather a lot of money isn't it?

Further I will reiterate again that the figures I have produced are very rough and likely very understated for three reasons.

A) I do not know if the figures used to calculate cost were global sales figures or US sales figures alone. I have used the smaller of the two at a time when Birds Eye's sales and market share was declining, which suggests the cost was probably much larger than I have allowed for.

B) The amount of Birds Eye product that was manufactured but not sold by the firm; i.e. its obsolescence and stock rotation figures, which would both likely be high as this was a time before computers had really come into supply chain management. This would mean that the figure that the cited cost per unit should be calculated against is likely much larger than the one I have used.

C) Whether the Birds Eye calculation has factored in any costs associated with kashrut certification but not directly charged to them as such; i.e. the implementation of new cleaning procedures, hiring new staff, the purchase of new machinery and so forth, or whether it is simply the cost of the rabbinical consultancy. The latter seems the most likely to me as I doubt Birds Eye would have put forward the former figure that could be broken down into speculative cost of sales/cost of production figures that would have given their rivals a measure of competitive advantage, while the latter could not.

Now if we understand this we can see that the real numbers; behind the rhetorically powerful, but statistically useless $0.0000065 figure, are actually a lot higher especially given that the ADL article (written in 1991) doesn't even factor that into their calculation.

If the figure does include costs associated with achieving kashrut certification then the figure is not likely to be too much higher (say $12,000-15,000), but if the costs are not included (as I suspect) then we are probably looking at a much higher figure in the realms of say $20,000-100,000 (in 2012 terms).

We may further demonstrate the absurd nature of the ADL's argument by pointing out that even a $100,000 worth of cost to the Birds Eye brand translates into $0.0002 cost per unit. Remember that I am using the highest figures of my cost estimation against very likely rather low Birds Eye figures and it becomes readily apparent that the ADL's argument is very simply a fallacy as the figure given by them is not representative of what they are trying to argue.

We can thus see the rotten core of what the ADL are actually arguing here: as they are saying; in effect, that $100,000 is mere chicken feed. Clearly it is not, but in suggesting it is the ADL conveniently show their intellectual hand by telling us it is.

The ADL's hand is very simple: they are trying to conflate the idea that the cost per unit is small with the kashrut certification organisations not having a significant turnover. This is clearly indicated by the ADL's citation of a letter written by Hans Schmidt (of GANPAC) to the Coors brewing company and their non-citation of any evidence against Schmidt's assertion that the Orthodox Union stood to make circa $450,000 from the kosher certification of Coors.

I have no idea if Schmidt's estimate was correct; although it does not seem that implausible given the turnover, profit margins and product range of Coors, but we may note that the ADL do not talk about what actually happens to the payment after it is received by the kashrut certification organisation. This in itself means that they are trying to imply; by lack of comment, that Schmidt's figures are nonsense and that the kashrut certification organisations don't make anywhere near that amount of money.

However the fact is that we know that these organisations do make a substantial amount in terms of turnover and make substantial profits as they use this money; as they are not for profit organisations and not the businesses they are claimed to be, (16) to fund jewish communal activities and political activities on a not inconsiderable scale. (17)

We may further intellectually roundhouse kick this notion that the business of kashrut certification is not a highly profitable one by pointing out that the certification arm of the Orthodox Union; one of the world leaders in kashrut certification (it operates in 83 countries!), is actually the major source of revenue for its many activities; including youth groups, a lobbying organisation, a 'Welcome Centre' is Israel and funding/helping affiliated synagogues. (18)

We may further point out that if the kashrut certification industry was not very profitable then we would not see so many firms competing in it (10 plus in the US alone) let alone have large international certification operations. (19) Indeed that this is the case is indicated by the distributed nature of the business and that the certification of kashrut is not undertaken; as in former times by the Kehilla/Kahals, centrally by one or two communal organisations but rather by a network of different and competing organisations. Nor would Muslim organisations of the same time and diverse nature be springing up to offer the same basic service if this was the case!

This therefore must be taken as evidence that these organisations are not operating on shoe-string budgets or profits, but rather are a flourishing trade in selling a brand (which is actually all they are doing [selling a mark/name]) that non-jewish consumers effectively contribute towards.

We can thus reasonably suggest that the kashrut certification business is not only profitable, but a veritable goldmine for jews.

If we understand this then it also proves the contention of Fields' implied argument about the kashrut certification industry. In that is used; as the organisations are not allowed to make a profit remember, to donate money to other jewish organisations (such as the World Jewish Congress in Fields' example) (20) and essentially help bankroll jewish organisations whose ideas and purpose is perceived to partially or wholly dovetail with their own.

In essence in Fields' argument there is no 'secret jewish world government' (which is simply the rhetorical fantasy of the 'debunkers'), but rather what arguably exists is a network of jewish organisations that are cash-infused; like the Orthodox Union, which then receive sales-pitches from cash-strapped jewish organisations for donations in return for advocacy on their behalf.

Such an arrangement is neatly pointed to by the existence of an Orthodox Union lobbying organisation (the neutrally-named 'Institute for Public Affairs'), which suggests by its existence that the Orthodox Union has found that other jewish organisations do not always perform the desired advocacy to their satisfaction. So rather than donate their profits wholly to others: the Orthodox Union decided in all probability to bring at least some of its lobbying activities in-house rather than farm them out to a jewish third-party via the cash-for-advocacy system.

This intimate connection between the kashrut certification organisations and other jewish organisations; which I have demonstrated briefly above, means that the notion that kashrut certification is simply a corporate expense like any other implodes, because it demonstrates that while you may pay costs for say carbon neutral certification: that money does not immediately get fed back into an umbrella group, which then spends part of that money on political advocacy for its own religious-beliefs and in particular for another state (Israel). (21)

This is hardly the same as spending $50,000 for a small marketing campaign: now is it?

References

(1) The only significant printed mentions I know of are to be found in Willis Carto's 'The Spotlight' and Ed Fields' 'The Truth at Last'. There are probably others but I have found no reference to them.
(2) http://voices.yahoo.com/the-kosher-food ... 57411.html
(3) http://oukosher.org/index.php/common/ar ... tax_fraud/
(4) http://www.snopes.com/racial/business/kosher.asp; http://kosher-food.blogspot.com/2007/05 ... -food.html
(5) http://www.adl.org/special_reports/kosher_tax/print.asp
(6) http://www.radioislam.org/judaism/kosher.htm
(7) http://oukosher.org/index.php/common/ar ... tax_fraud/
(8) The kosher food tax thesis being ipso facto 'anti-Semitic' is the kind of jewish victimology and nonsense that Albert Lindemann (1997, 'Esau's Tears: Modern Anti-Semitism and the Rise of the Jews', 1st Edition, Cambridge University Press: New York, p. xiii) rails against.
(9) http://www.snopes.com/racial/business/kosher.asp; http://kosher-food.blogspot.com/2007/05 ... -edge.html; http://www.boycottwatch.org/misc/koshertax1.htm
(10) http://kosher-food.blogspot.com/2007/05 ... -food.html
(11) http://www.boycottwatch.org/misc/koshertax1.htm
(12) http://kosher-food.blogspot.com/2007/05 ... -food.html
(13) http://www.adl.org/special_reports/kosher_tax/print.asp
(14) Ibid.
(15) http://www.referenceforbusiness.com/his ... s-Inc.html; I have used sales figures to give an approximation of the number of units produced. For the sake of argument I have assumed the mean cost of the Birds Eye product to be $1: this is likely incorrect and will be amended when I locate pricing data for Birds Eye products in the US in 1975.
(16) http://www.snopes.com/racial/business/kosher.asp
(17) http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340 ... 55,00.html
(18) http://www.ou.org/; I would have to check the OU's books to be absolutely sure, but given that their two other sources of revenue (donations and a niche jewish publisher) are unlikely to bring in large amounts of money that would be required to fund their own myriad of expensive sub-organisations (including a whole lobbying organisation) then we may reasonable extrapolate that the OU makes a rather large amount of profit from its kashrut certification operations.
(19) For a quick run down of some of them see: http://www.ncoal.com/ncflyers/Kosher_Tax(FL).pdf
(20)http://www.radioislam.org/judaism/kosher.htm
(21) Implied by Stephen Walt, John Mearsheimer, 2007, 'The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy', 1st Edition, Farrar, Straus and Giroux: New York, p. 126

The Kosher Food Tax: Debunking the Debunkers (Part II)

Now if we bear in mind that the example the ADL pamphlet cites as to imply supposed poverty of the kashrut certification organisations and combine that with the knowledge that the Orthodox Union alone; according to their own website, certifies circa 500,000 individual products per annum: it is clear that the costs of kashrut certification are not as minuscule as claimed by the 'debunkers'.

Now as the Birds Eye brand covers numerous different products: lets be cautious in our rough calculation of the Orthodox Union's potential turnover. Lets say that each brand; like Birds Eye, contains a mean average of 50 products and that each brand; if we follow the ADL's logic, is being kashrut certified writ large rather than individually.

That means that the Orthodox Union are annually certifying some 10,000 brands as kosher: now if we assume even a small fee of say $1,000 for annual re-certification it is clear that the Orthodox Union is making some $10,000,000 just from this. If we then allow for the one off gearing up charges that are incurred by the firm in making kashrut certification possible then we can very quickly break the $20,000,000 mark.

That is; of course, assuming a tiny and disproportionately small gearing up charge of an additional $1,000 per brand or $10,000,000 in one off fees to the Orthodox Union. However if we move the figures up to a more reasonable; if still relatively small, range of figures per brand; remember not per product, then we get get something in the region of $30,000,000 to $200,000,000 in one off fees to the Orthodox Union.

Some might suggest that this is disproportionate or that this absurd: however we can dispose of this by noting as the Orthodox Union themselves state that: certain 'system changes' maybe required for kashrut certification. (22)

This sounds innocent enough until we understand that 'system changes' is corporate jargon for process changes or in other words: firms are likely to have to make significant amendments to how they manufacture or produce a good for it to be considered as a candidate for kashrut certification by the Orthodox Union.

What those changes are likely to be is also easy to explain in three simple examples:

A) All the external purchased ingredients that need to go into the manufacturing process need to be from kashrut certified producers or certified to be such by the Orthodox Union. This means in practice that if you do not have a kashrut certified supplier; or one with a kashrut certification that your own certifier accepts as valid, then your supplier is going to have to be certified themselves or you are going to have move to a new supplier in order to acquire your own kashrut certification with all the attendant costs that either of these possibilities entail.

B) New cleaning processes need to be brought in, which are far more rigorous and detailed than those which are normally conducted by firms to meet the standards of cleanliness required of them by governmental regulators. To give an idea of how different such processes can be: a machine that is used to produce a meat-based product would normally merely have to be cleaned at periodic intervals. However in kashrut this machine must be cleaned of all traces of the previous process; even to the point of disassembling parts of the machine to clean places that material from the previous meat-based process might have gotten, before a dairy-based process can begin in order for that dairy-based product to be considered kosher.

C) New equipment and machinery is likely going to be required in order to split out kosher manufacture from non-kosher manufacture. For example if a firm makes meat pies; some of which can be certified as kosher and some which cannot, but it currently uses the same machinery to make both say chicken (kosher) and pork (treif) pies. Then in order to achieve kashrut certification then the firm is very likely going to need to purchase separate equipment and machinery in order to produce chicken and pork pies separately or completely discontinue producing pork pies.

It thus clear with a little bit of consideration that the process of kashrut certification can easily begin to rack-up the one off gearing up charges as well as being very likely to increase the cost base of the business in the medium to long term. As after all new processes and equipment cost money both to implement and maintain, which is again a factor that is nonsensically excluded by 'debunkers' in their attacks on the theory.

The 'debunker' will likely at this point interject and assert that what I have listed above are not paid directly to the kashrut certification organisations such as the Orthodox Union. That much is true: however what that argument misses out is two-fold.

Firstly that during this gearing up process the firm that is seeking kashrut certification is liable for all expenses incurred by the rabbinical inspectors in addition to the fact that kashrut certification generally works on a consultancy basis (unless the contract is very large in scope when a fixed fee for the complete service tends to be negotiated).

Or put more simply: the firm seeking the certification pays a fixed scale of charges for the on-site time of the rabbinical inspectors to the kashrut certification organisation. The longer this goes on for; i.e. the more picky (within reason) the rabbinical inspector is, the more the kashrut certification organisation charges to the firm seeking the certification.

The rabbinical inspectors also have an important motivation; or possibly excuse, to be picky precisely because the kashrut certification business is built solely on the reliability and reputation of the brand and if the brand were to be uncovered to be lacking in kashrut rigor then it would likely either lose a lot of its customer base as well as brand loyalty if indeed it did not fold completely like in the Agriprocessors farrago.

This means; of course, that in the gearing up process the consultancy fees charged to the firm seeking the certification are likely to be considerable and the more so if the certification is a complicated one (such as producing chicken and pork meat pies on the same premises).

Secondly the kashrut certification organisations would be missing a substantial trick if they did not keep lists of preferred vendors of certain kashrut staples: such as suitably certified kosher abattoirs, manufacturers of specialist kosher sinks and so on. This means that when the firm is seeking to gear up for kashrut certification: the organisations doing the certification can produce these lists of preferred vendors that the firm can modify their manufacturing processes in partnership with.

The way preferred vendor status works; of course, is simple in that the kashrut certification organisation receives what is known as a finders fee for the business; usually a fixed amount or a fixed percentage of the net worth of the finalized contract, from the preferred vendor.

This situation also can be seen to work to the advantage of the firm seeking kashrut certification. This is in so far as purchasing from a preferred vendor ensures that there will be no issue with the quality of what has been produced and it also pushes partial liability if there is an problem in relation to certification onto the certifying organisation itself.

However this situation has its downsides as well as preferred vendors tend to charge more; as they are dealing with a quasi-captive market, for their products and services then would normally be the case on the open market if the firm had been able to shop around.

Thus we can see that the kashrut certification organisation can easily make a substantial amount in fees in this gearing up process, which demonstrates the truth of my above contention that the one off gearing up costs are significant and further demonstrates the way in which a firm maybe forced to substantially change their; presumably previously successful, business model to accommodate such a certification.

Now returning to the issue of whether this is a 'normal business expense' we can point out that in the pure notion of being a simple business expense: this is true in a sense. However; as I have previously pointed out, the fact that the fees are being charged by not-for-profit organisations with direct links to political advocacy groups and a foreign country changes the game considerably.

The nature of that change is very simple in that it effectively means that firms who pay for kashrut certification are indirectly funding a foreign government; which has a recent history of strong hostility to just about every other country on the planet (in itself tantamount to trading with the enemy), and/or specific political policies which are not unlikely to be contrary to the beliefs and ideas espoused by their end customers.

So; for example, if one company pays for kashrut certification by the Orthodox Union and the money that this generates is used to help fund the settlement of orthodox jews on disputed land in Palestine. This then comes out in a big flurry of media publicity and many customers of this company are involved in protests against this policy. However they have; in the intervening period, purchased the products produced by this company not knowing that this company had knowing or not aided this political policy they disagree with by paying for kashrut certification through the Orthodox Union.

Then this means that by not informing their customers of what the kashrut certification meant: the company concerned has generated a large amount of unwanted negative publicity quite probably resulting in a loss of brand loyalty as well as predictable issues with consumers rights groups because of the lack of information about this issue made publicly available by the company.

On the other side of the fence the customer has also indirectly contributed towards a cause that they actively oppose while being ignorant through no fault of their own to the situation. In addition they have directly contributed to religious organisations who; or whose practices, they may oppose or see as unconstitutional.

In effect the firm and the customer both lose by this certification precisely because it is not a normal certification expense in so far as the money indirectly goes towards the support not of an organisational structure or largely neutral causes but rather goes to support politically explosive causes and a religious structure that they are likely unaware of at the outset.

Now some 'debunkers'; like Barbara Mikkelson, (23) argue using clever rhetorical imagery; taken right out of the Ciceronian play-book I might add, that this certification is a 'normal' business expense on the grounds that if we accept that the kashrut certification acts like a tax on consumers then so does normal marketing and production costs (which therefore should be understood within that intellectual paradigm).

This seems cogent and even rational until we acknowledge that in using this reduction to absurdity Mikkelson fundamentally ignores the significantly different nature of paying an actively political organisation for a certification to paying a company for a brightly coloured poster on a main thoroughfare.

Mikkelson's argument is imploded by acknowledging that kashrut certification organisations are an intimate part of their local jewish communities and in addition usually being not-for-profit organisations they contribute a large amount of their turnover to other organisations, which are frequently heavily politicised.

If we understand this then it clear that Mikkelson's reduction to absurdity is not correct, but would rather be better being restated with kashrut certification being compared to gaining formal certification from the Republican or Democratic party that for an endorsement a commercial product so that their supporters can know that they have benefited from their purchase of said product.

Restating Mikkelson's reduction to absurdity in a more reasonable form thus shows that her argument is not only poorly-researched (as she doesn't recognise the link between kosher certification organisations and the wider jewish community and/or their parent organisations [for example the link between Orthodox Union Kosher and the Orthodox Union]) but also fallacious.

It thus clear that the expense of kashrut certification cannot be considered to be a normal business expense in the sense that Mikkelson and other 'debunkers' mean it: precisely because it is a very different beast to other expenses.

This then leads us nicely onto another issue that often rears its head in 'debunker' literature. This relates to the rhetorical name given to the issue of the cost of kashrut certification: the Kosher Food Tax.

Now the 'debunkers' have been quick to pounce on the use of the term 'tax' to attempt to dismiss the argument offered in its favour. (24) They charge that the term 'tax' is incorrect (25) and that it is used by proponents of the theory for rhetorical effect. (26)

This as far as it goes is correct: the term 'tax' is technically incorrect and it is used to rhetorical effect. Much in the same way as the ADL use 'racist' and 'anti-Semitic' in their short pamphlet attacking the theory (27) and the 'Kosher Food' blog uses 'hate'. (28)

The problem with that is very simple and maybe rhetorically expressed as the following question: what has hate got to do with it?

To explain: it doesn't actually matter or have any bearing on the factual or counter-factual nature of the argument being made about kashrut certification. After all regardless of whether kashrut certification is technically a tax or an expense does not detract from the fact that the money is paid to these certification organisations for the use of their brand, what these certification organisations then use the money for as; by en-large, not-for-profit legal entities and that there is a distinct lack of awareness of what that brand means among passive customers (as it is not prominently displayed for example).

These are the crux of the argument around religious certification and more specifically in this case kashrut certification not whether or not it is actually a tax or not.

A tax may be very simply defined as a mandatory payment made to an organisation in return for contracted benefits in kind. A kind of mandatory quid pro quo if you will.

Now clearly kashrut certification is not a mandatory payment to the kashrut organisations, but rather one that is ultimately voluntary on the both the part of the certified party and the end consumers.

Therefore kashrut certification cannot be a tax, because it lacks the mandatory aspect to it.

Now in spite of this; as I have above noted, it does not prove or disprove the issue that is actually under consideration of whether the payment of fees for kashrut certification by companies is then passed onto the end customer. This is the issue that lies behind the whole rhetorical use of the term 'tax' by proponents of the theory.

Now; as my foregoing summation has detailed, national and multinational corporations are able to absorb the not insignificant costs associated with the attainment and maintenance of kashrut certification as these costs are; in the context of their balance sheets, relatively small. However; as before stressed, this should not be understood as meaning; as the ADL are quick to try and imply, (29) that the actual amounts, but only small in that very specific context.

This means that the customer is not likely to pay anything extra; or have an additional expense, caused by kashrut certification, but in spite of this in purchasing a kashrut certified product they are still contributing money to the kashrut certification organisation by proxy and by not actively voting with their purchases.

This brings me to where I substantially disagree with Ed Fields' (30) and Ernesto Cienfuegos' (31) analysis in that they both assume that national and multinational corporations pass the cost of kashrut certification directly onto their customers. As one of the main arenas for corporate and brand competition is around the issue of price this seems rather unlikely given that the expense incurred will be spread out by economies of scale and easily paid for by larger sums of ready cash in these larger organisations.

This means that such large corporations will treat the cost of kashrut certification as just another business expense; not realising the potential consumer and brand implications that I have highlighted above, and is the origin of the 'debunker' argument that kashrut certification is a business expense like any other.

What; as I have pointed out above, this ignores is the fact that kashrut certification doesn't just impact the big corporations with deep pockets of this world, but it also has a substantial impact on SMEs and particularly on eateries and restaurants.

Now these companies do not have the benefits of the economies of scale of larger firms and nor do they tend to have large amounts of ready cash as most of their capital tends to be tied up in their fixed and variable assets. This means that any expense they have to make a cash outlay for affects them in far greater proportion to a national or multinational company.

The outcome of this is when a SME applies for kashrut certification they are taking a far greater risk proportionally than larger companies and only do so; as one 'debunker' has correctly pointed out, (32) because they believe that the potential benefits outweigh the potential cost.

That means in laymen's terms that if the perceived potential benefits do not materialise then the SME has to recoup the cost from somewhere and as it is not likely to have the necessary funds in its reserve of ready cash then it is very likely to target either its variable costs (which is a high risk strategy) or pass on the cost in the form of a one off or phased rise in the price to the end customer (which is a low risk strategy).

Sample evidence for just such a situation may be presented in the form of a letter to the editor published in the 'Jewish Telegraph' in May 2011. To wit:

'Expensive Pesach

Pesach is over, but once again the cost of keeping kosher rears its ugly head.

When is someone going to tackle this constantly recurring subject?

Pesach this year seems to have been more extortionate than ever. And before the "dedicated" reach for their pens to advise me I don't have to buy any "unnecessary luxuries", I don't think eight days on matzo and butter and only the bare essentials is a very attractive proposition.

If you have children and grandchildren, it's nice to be able to offer a drink of orange juice and perhaps a bit of chocolate!

The inescapable fact is that in the not-too-distant future, kosher food in general - and Pesach in particular - will become the exclusive domain of the committed (for whom no sacrifice is too great) and the wealthy, (for whom any amount can be spent without jeopardising anything else).

The rest are going to find themselves with some difficult choices.

People will tell me "supervision" is expensive. Do we have hoards of hibernating shomrim worldwide who suddenly make an appearance pre-Pesach to possibly earn large amounts in a few weeks?

Our rabbonim have no qualms about standing in the pulpit exhorting the congregation to donate for the needy who can't afford to make Pesach.

Why don't they exhort the retailers to reduce their prices, take less profit and make it easier for people to be able to keep kosher?

Let's not leave it too late.

Dennis Fisher,' (33)

Now Fisher's letter clearly supports the argument of the passing of kashrut certification costs on to the end consumer; whether they be jewish or not (although these would obviously massively disproportionately paid by non-jews rather than the actual jewish users of this service), which leads to significant price rises. Indeed that he complains that less wealthy jews are being 'priced out of the market' by the rises should give us pause for thought as it suggests that this; as I have argued extensively above, is not an industry that is run on a shoe-string budget or profit margin.


References

(22) http://www.oukosher.org/index.php/basics/steps
(23) http://www.snopes.com/racial/business/kosher.asp
(24) http://kosher-food.blogspot.com/2007/05 ... -food.html
(25) http://voices.yahoo.com/the-kosher-food ... 57411.html
(26) http://kosher-food.blogspot.com/2007/05 ... -food.html; http://www.adl.org/special_reports/kosher_tax/print.asp; http://www.snopes.com/racial/business/kosher.asp
(27) http://www.adl.org/special_reports/kosher_tax/print.asp
(28) http://kosher-food.blogspot.com/2007/05 ... -food.html
(29) http://www.adl.org/special_reports/kosher_tax/print.asp
(30) http://www.radioislam.org/judaism/kosher.htm
(31) http://rense.com/general24/koshernostra.htm
(32) http://kosher-food.blogspot.com/2007/05 ... -edge.html
(33) http://semiticcontroversies.blogspot.co ... ce-of.html

The Kosher Food Tax: Debunking the Debunkers (Part III)

Fisher's letter also gives us some insight into the intimate links; which I have above detailed, between the kashrut certification organisations and other jewish organisations such as AIPAC, NORPAC, both AJCs, the ZoA and so forth. It also points out that this link is not only found in North America, but also across the world in so far; as previously pointed out in relation to the Orthodox Union, as these kashrut certification organisations operate on a global scale and as such do not confine their activities; as unfortunately both Fields and Cienfuegos directly imply they do, to the United States, but rather are very active in Europe, Africa, the Middle East, Asia as well as Central and South America.

This means; of course, that the scope of the argument around the cost and the size of the income of these not-for-profit organisations is necessarily far greater than both proponents and 'debunkers' have believed. The reason for this focus on the United States is probably due to kosher certification having its origins there in 1935 as a method for jews who wished to keep kosher to make sure they were purchasing appropriate foodstuffs. In addition to the fact that the kosher food tax theory seems to have come about solely in the United States in 1950s/1960s and has only really been argued there since as the amount of literature in other languages other than English is even smaller than the tiny amount available in it.

As such then we can see that small businesses are disproportionately affected by the costs of kashrut certification and as such are more likely to increase the price paid by the end consumer in order to recoup the money of that certification. This concept of the cost of kashrut certification either being met by a rise in turnover or a rise in prices/cutting out the firm's cost base (including jobs) to cover the cost of the gearing up, the maintenance and re-certification of the products concerned is central to understanding why the costs of kashrut certification are likely going to be charged onto to the end consumer by SMEs in many cases.

This boolean position of either the firm making the necessary turnover or not to cover the costs must be further clarified by understanding that the size of the kosher market; in spite of some attempts to imply it is quite large, is actually rather small. In so far as active kosher consumers are only really found in the religious jewish, some of the non-religious jewish, some of the Islamic and some of the Seventh Day Adventist communities. Now none of these communities are very large and amount to no more than perhaps 2-3 percent of the population of the United States.

That means; of course, that the market for kosher goods is actually a small one and indeed should be described as purely a niche market: however that niche market is massively over-saturated and is monthly increasing in that over-saturation.

We may divine this by acknowledging that many; if not most, common pre-packaged products in the United States are kashrut certified (necessarily implied by the number of certification organisations and the number of their clients) for example. This means that we actually have a niche market that is being serviced by the majority of competitors in a multitude of different major and minor markets.

This means of course that the market has to be saturated as otherwise there are either a lot of people deliberately keeping kosher who don't tell anyone about it or the census data is wrong.

I rather doubt either of these alternative possibilities is the case: don't you?

We should further stress in this vein that; although commonly cited, the Islamic; and to a lesser extent the Seventh Day Adventist, communities only use kashrut certified products as a substitute when there are no products that have their own certification stamp on them to buy. This important caveat is not mentioned by 'debunkers' for the obvious reason that it crushes a key part of their argument: that there is a considerable and ready market of active consumers for kashrut goods beyond observant and non-observant jews.

This bit of reasoning on the 'debunkers' part leads them to such amusing claims that 'kosher is a sign of quality'. I should point out that the 'logic' behind claims like this exposes the kind of double think that jews tend to engage in when arguing on controversial topics like this: in so far as they talk about 'hate'/'racism' but then the claim that 'kosher is better' is based on the assumption that as kashrut was divined by Hashem for the jews to keep them 'pure' that therefore means that the products produced to the various kashrut standards quite literally 'cleaner'/'higher quality' than mere gentile food (i.e. jews are superior to non-jews).

Now; to get back to the thrust of my argument, if kashrut is largely limited to observant and non-observant jews with occasional use by sections of the Islamic and Seventh Day Adventist population then it means that the market has to be a niche one and cannot be anything else. This leads; as I have stated, to the necessary conclusion that the kosher market is not only saturated but likely many times over-saturated by competing firms.

This then leads us to ask the following question: why then do companies gear up for kashrut certification, maintain the processes and want to re-certify themselves every year?

We should note in this context that the argument advanced by 'debunkers' such as the 'Kosher Food' blog, (34) Mikkelson (35) and the ADL (36) is that companies would only pay (and continue to pay) kashrut certification charges if they were making profit from doing so.

This again sounds quite convincing and rational: doesn't it?

However like so many 'debunker' arguments if we examine this thinking we can quickly see that it falls apart by understanding the central assumption behind it.

That assumption; which is called the 'Rational Economic Man', is a common one in economic and political theory, but that is where it is meant to stay. It is very simply a hypothetical perfect, results-based and objective decision-maker in the business environment.

Or put another way: a perfectly ruthless businessman who only performs actions when they make him money and stops actions when they do not.

We can apply this to the argument made by the debunkers, which is beautifully encapsulated at the 'Kosher Food' blog when it states:

'Simply put Kosher Certification is expenses that can only be justified if it has a rate of return exceeds the expense. Companies do this in the hope the expense can be justified to sway people to buy their product over other brands. Nor would a food company price them out of the market.' (37)

In addition to:

'If making money is a bad thing. Then go to work for a company that isn't making money.

How do you support your family, plan for your monthly expenses. Pay your mortgages, buy food for your family, electricity, water and all the things you want to provide for your family.

A Rabbi doing kosher certification has a vested interest in the food company staying in business not out of greed but so he can provide for family too and provide kosher food for people to eat. The only way this happens is when it makes good business sense and makes a profit for the food company.' (38)

Now the problem with all this is that it relies on the sole intellectual prop of the rational economic man being not only the ideal economic/commercial scenario, but that all decision-makers (or at the very least the ones making the decision whether to kashrut certify or not) are in harmony with this ideal.

We can cause this argument to come crashing down in a ball of flames by kicking out this intellectual prop with the understanding that; as I have stated, the rational economic man is a hypothetical ideal: it is not the reality of the situation. If it were the truth of the situation then companies would not fail as such and would instead come to a form of what has been termed 'coopetition' where firms cooperate with each other to better enable them to compete in what sometimes to illegal activities such as price-fixing.

If we understand the reality then we need to factor in the human element to business activities, which necessarily includes highly-politicized behaviour where bad decisions are swept under the rug, the causes of successes are misidentified (deliberately and/or mistakenly), costly mistakes are hidden behind walls of data and fancy PowerPoint presentations, life-or-death business decisions are made on the basis of current corporate fashions and statistics and so forth.

Essentially the 'Kosher Food' blog's arguments; as well as those by Mikkelson, Boycott Watch and the ADL, all assume the perfect economic scenario of profit/loss sheet meritocratic business: the reality of the corporate world is quite the opposite. After all it is filled with humans not Nietzschian supermen or humanoid calculating machines (no not accountants).

Unfortunately we can hardly credit the 'debunker' arguments as being honest mistakes precisely it is a very obvious use of a utopian position in contrast to the well-known and bitter reality of business. Thus we must conclude that they are contrived positions based on the need to defend a position with few intellectual weapons other than pure ideology.

The 'debunker' will likely respond to this collapse of their argument by asserting; as the 'Kosher Food' blog, has done that 'statistics prove' their argument is correct, because the kosher industry is growing and the market expanding.

The statistics used by 'Kosher Food' blog; the original article they came from is no longer extant, are simply that retail food sales grew 6% in the United States in 2006, but in contrast the retail sales of kosher foods grew 15% in the same year. Suggesting a thriving kosher market that is a better investment than the larger retail food market itself. (39)

This again sounds solid: doesn't it?

However in spite of the lack of the original source it is not difficult to reveal this to be a statistical red herring.

We can show this very simply by understanding the logic behind the figures used in that retail food sales includes all food sales; including kashrut and non-kashrut certified foods, and as such superficially seems to provide a good benchmark to compare kashrut-certified foods against (hence its rhetorical potential).

However the 'sales of kosher foods' are not reasonably comparable to this (i.e. it actually means very little) for two very simple reasons:

A) 'Kosher foods' simply means foods that have been certified as kashrut by an kashrut certification organisation: this means that the growth of kashrut food sales is not necessarily governed by their actual market performance, but can also be governed by increasing amounts of food products being kashrut certified.

In essence you can 'grow kashrut sales' by increasing the number of kashrut certified products and if; as I have above summarised, the amount of products that are kashrut certified is growing then it means that necessarily the amount of kashrut sales will increase and there will alleged growth in the kashrut food market.

This means; in effect, that when say a new popular sports drink is kashrut certified then all the active (i.e. jewish/Islamic/Seventh Day Adventist) and passive (i.e. those not buying a product because or knowing it is kashrut certified) sales are included as 'kosher sales' (i.e. active sales). In other words the figures count all the people who purchase a product for any reason or reasons other than it is kashrut certified as having actively bought the product, because it was kashrut certified.

B) 'Kosher foods' are a small arena for business; that should be viewed as a niche market, in terms of their active sales: however because they are still a relatively small area any new product; with all it concomitant sales, that is certified as kashrut are going to have a disproportionate impact on the percentage growth.

A quick thought experiment will suffice in so far an $60,000 increase in a total market worth $1,000,000 is going to be a much smaller percentage than a $60,000 increase in a sub-market worth $100,000. Is it not?

However we should note that the 'Kosher Food' blog doesn't mention this considerable issue with its 'evidence' and from this we can see; once again, that 'debunkers' of what is rhetorically-called the 'kosher food tax' present an ideologically-driven and seemingly dishonest case.

Thus we can see that the figure is not what it is claimed to be and does not show a 'growing market', but only an increasing number of companies becoming kashrut certified.

If we understand this then we can see that figures cited are very misleading and in fact portray what we can refer to as the myth of the flourishing kosher market.

This myth lies at the heart of understanding the apparent paradox of a small/niche market that; as the cited statistics illustrate, claims to be growing in spite of only specifically serving a tiny minority of the available customer base.

This myth of flourishing kosher market is very simple and self-perpetuating in that kashrut certification organisations market their brand to companies on figures; like those I have cited above, of a quickly expanding kosher market that they tantalizingly suggest they (the company) have yet to exploit. The company sees all the big names who have invested in kashrut certification as a marketing strategy to maximise the appeal of their products, which implicitly suggests to them that such an investment could and should also work for them.

After all; they reason, if HJ Heinz and Starbucks are kashrut certified then in order to compete with them and/or companies like them then they also need to make sure they at least have all the same opportunities these large companies have that are financially feasible for a smaller company.

Thus the company decides to invest in kashrut certification and in doing so becomes another listed client of the kashrut certification organisation they have chosen. When the company has had its chosen products successfully certified as kashrut compliant then the companies sales are moved from non-kosher food sales into kosher food sales.

This then means that when statistical figures; like the one cited by the 'Kosher Food' blog, come out they seem to be growing because the entire sales of the kashrut certified products from our hypothetical company; and others like it, are now included as part of the 'kosher food' market and excluded from the 'non-kosher food' market.

This then gives the kashrut certification organisations more marketing and sales 'evidence' to present to potential clients and sales leads about how kashrut certification can expand their business.

Then the cycle starts again with a new company.

From this we can see that the kashrut certification industry acts rather like a gigantic ponzi scheme in so far as it is effectively 'paying' its current investors with sales statistics that are driven by attracting new investors. The trick of the ponzi scheme; like the kashrut certification industry, is investor confidence that they are actually seeing returns on their investment. If that confidence crashes and people begin to take a hard look at the figures then the entire edifice crumbles back into what it truly is: a small niche market rather than a large, eternally growing market.

The difference of course is that the kashrut certification industry promises unrealistic sales returns rather than unrealistic monetary returns. It maintains those sales figures by using press releases and marketing material/studies about the eternal growth of the kosher markets to keep the 'feel good' factor alive and well in their customer and potential customer base. This then attunes decision-makers and analysts in corporations to thinking positively about the impact of kashrut certification making it a form of commercial sacred cow.

The mentality that this creates in companies is akin to a business fashion in that they will tend to attribute; without detailed research, increases in sales/turnover to attaining or switching to a stricter kashrut certification. The businessman will not look to see whether this has any evidential basis or that there were other market factors involved; for example a series of population television ads, but rather attribute it; at least in significant part, to the large new thing they have done (kashrut certification), which also 'looks good' in their marketing prospectus and on their resume.

Once the idea that kashrut certification is a necessary part of business has become ingrained in the corporate culture of the firm then it becomes very hard to remove as in becoming established within a company it has created its own political stakeholders who will defend it as a necessary cost (i.e. a sacred cow) of the business. Only by removing those stakeholders or diminishing their influence will allow a company to take a long hard look at kashrut certification.

The crux of the 'market growth' of kashrut certification industry is then created by a closed system of business group-think of getting 'market growth' by getting more companies certified than drop the certification and acquiring more companies as customers by getting more 'market growth'.

As I have stated when you think about it: it is very close to a good old fashioned ponzi scheme without the stocks and shares.


References

(34) http://kosher-food.blogspot.com/2007/05 ... -food.html
(35) http://www.snopes.com/racial/business/kosher.asp
(36) http://www.adl.org/special_reports/kosher_tax/print.asp
(37) http://kosher-food.blogspot.com/2007/05 ... -edge.html
(38) http://kosher-food.blogspot.com/2007/05 ... -food.html
(39) http://kosher-food.blogspot.com/2007/05 ... -edge.html

The Kosher Food Tax: Debunking the Debunkers (Part IV)

Now if we relate this ponzi scheme type scenario back on to large corporations and SMEs we can see that there is a very real difference in how kashrut certification affects them not in terms of what they have pay, but rather in their ability to pay. In other words large corporations are able to pay without passing the cost along to the end consumer; although they can do this if they wish it is doubtful if it will have been done because it can easily be paid for in marketing/sales expenses, however; as we have discussed, with SMEs; and particularly among restaurants and eateries, there is far more likely to be an inability to pay these costs without the turnover increases that the kashrut certification organisations market themselves on.

If we understand this then we can see the 'debunker' intellectual game for what it is. That game is very simple: namely the 'debunkers' are confusing two completely different issues with each other in order to make their argument tenable.

What they are deliberately confusing is the cost to the end consumer; which is the ADL's chimerical $0.0000065 cost per unit, and the amount paid in fees and other charges back to the kashrut certification organisations.

This is exhibited when nearly all 'debunkers' talk of 'minuscule' costs to firms (using the ADL article as a frequently non-cited but never-the-less implied reference) and therefore little cost of the consumer, which is not the same thing as saying that the kashrut certification organisations make barely enough to live off of.

This assertion is more implied than openly stated, but as part of the kosher food tax thesis; as Fields' argument clearly demonstrates, (40) is that the profits from such an operation go to jewish organisations; particularly pro-Israel ones. then it is clear that when 'debunkers' talk of the kashrut certification organisations not donating anything to the jewish lobby (which they also see as a myth) (41) they mean to indicate; in the context of their previous assertion about the 'minuscule' nature of the charge, that the kashrut certification only make enough of a turnover to cover their costs or produce a minimal profit.

However; as the sharp-eyed reader may have picked up, this idea of the kashrut certification industry not making any money (or charging very much for its services) is completely at odds with the number of organisations that are competing in this industry (at least dozens and some reports suggest this is in the hundreds) with market leaders; such as the Orthodox Union, certifying some 500,000 products annually.

Thus we can see that the skeptical argument is just a little contrived and indeed can; as I shall go into in a separate article, be said to generally derive its facts, claims and conclusions from a single article: that of the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai Brith published in 1991. That; as even the most pedestrian of intellects should quickly realise, makes the 'debunker' argument against the existence of the proverbial 'Kosher Food Tax' weak in the extreme as it relies heavily on the accuracy and objectivity of the ADL article, whose virtues; as has been demonstrated above, are in extremely short supply.

One last 'debunker' argument presents itself for consideration and is found exclusively at the 'Kosher Food' blog. To wit:

'A Rabbi doing kosher certification has a vested interest in the food company staying in business not out of greed but so he can provide for family too and provide kosher food for people to eat. The only way this happens is when it makes good business sense and makes a profit for the food company.

For those out there that think this is a kosher tax and all Jews think about is money. It is a lot easier to ask for and get a raise from a company that is making a profit than one that is bankrupt.' (42)

This argument is somewhat disingenuous in that it assumes that in order for someone to make a profit then cooperation for mutual benefit is required. This is; unfortunately for author of this argument, is not very credible as it once again assumes an ideal scenario is the reality, which is clearly not going to be the case.

Now it is true that a rabbi would prefer his client to remain in business, but this is not strictly speaking necessary. The reason for that is very simple: the rabbi is offering a service and it is not his concern as to where the company contracting him gets the money to pay him, but rather that the company does pay him. He does not know the financial health of the company and nor can he really know (it being confidential information): he knows only that he has been contracted to certify the company and that is his sole prerogative.

The 'debunker' who makes the argument I have cited might try to counter that it is still the rabbi's concern as he wants to have the annual fees as well.

That is indeed true: kashrut certification organisations do want their clients to stay in business, but the important point to clarify is so do they.

What I mean by that remark is revealed when we understand that; as I have explained above, the kashrut certification industry is built purely on the consumer image of their brand and its integrity. If that brand's image is in any way compromised publicly with its clientèle then the kashrut certification organisation which owns it may very well fold entirely.

What then are the rabbi's priorities?

Our 'debunker' would have us believe they are to keep the costs down for the company seeking certification: however realising of the nature of this purely brand image driven industry implodes this contention as it is clearly far more important for the rabbi to be as strict as possible (within reason) so that he is kept in a job.

After all there are many other firms to certify: if one folds then it means the loss of a client, but if the kashrut certification organisation folds because of the rabbi's compromise of quality on the altar of cost to the client then he not only will be out of a job but will not be able to get another!

Thus we can see that the 'debunker' is merely artificially contriving an argument to try and claim that the jews keep costs down for companies and that his conclusion simply doesn't flow from its premises.

We have thus far discussed and demonstrated that the idea of a large amount of money being made by kosher certification organisations off of gentile consumers and companies is not only not a myth, but also that the extant objections against the thesis thus far are easily removed if we but take the time to understand the thinking that lies behind them.

Having done this; and without going into to much fine detail, we still have two issues that need be brought up and discussed briefly.

Firstly is the fact that kashrut certification extends beyond what debunkers commonly assume; i.e. food, but into other items such as clothing as the laws of kashrut; for example, explicitly rule that wool and linen shall not be combined in the same garment. Even if there is a separation of a different material in place then this clothing is treif and thus no observant jew is allowed to wear it on pain of rabbinical censure.

Thus we can very quickly see the need for kashrut certification in clothing for observant jews as one needs to know precisely whether a clothing product contains materials that cannot be mixed. Thus we can see that when an observant jewess goes clothes shopping they are not unlikely to look at the label to see if there is a kashrut certification brand and if there is not: whether it two or more materials that may not be mixed together.

This is a market that has still largely remained unexploited by the kashrut certification organisations as far as I am aware and I would venture that the reason for this is not from a lack of effort, but rather from the difficulty of trying to create a 'kosher market' where there historically has never really been one (other than in jewish produced clothes for jews). It is well-known that jews have to keep kosher with their food, but it is not so well-known that is extends far beyond that into their lives writ large: so in essence jews are competing against the popular grain here and are having little success.

However; in spite of this lack of general success, we should add that the lack of mention of this by 'debunkers' and their sole focus on food gives the lie to their claims of a market of active consumers other than jews. This is because kashrut; unlike halal, extends well beyond foodstuffs and into every facet of life. This means that the 'debunker' argument that uses the purchase of kashrut products by Muslims and Seventh Day Adventists is null and void, because it only applies to food and not to other areas of kashrut.

Essentially 'debunkers' argue that because of active non-jewish usage: the kashrut certification costs do not benefit jews alone, but the problem with that is because once we recognise that this is only somewhat true on food alone; while kashrut certification extends beyond that, then it means that the 'debunkers' have taken a selective part of kashrut and claimed it as the whole of kashrut. Or in other words: the 'debunkers' have distorted the facts; deliberately or through ignorance, to fit their preconceived conclusions.

The second issue that needs to be brought out and briefly discussed relates to a little thought about sub-issue to the 'kosher food tax' thesis: what happens to the treif in kashrut?

To explain: in the process of kashrut slaughter; Shechita, there are parts of even a permitted animal; such as a cow, that cannot be eaten or there is the very real possibility that something will go wrong in the ritual slaughtering process.

With a cow we may note with wry amusement that anything beyond the thirteenth rib is considered treif and also; according to some interpretations, so are the legs. However this explicitly excludes the prime cuts of beef that are taken from these forbidden areas, which the jews are careful to assert are kosher. After all the Rabbi doesn't want to give up his beef dinner now does he?

It is thus clear that there is a not inconsiderable rate of wastage in the practice of shechita and that the jews either will have to get rid of this treif matter as simple waste or sell it on. Now jews being jews they have elected to sell it on to non-kashrut manufacturers at the highest possible price. These companies are well aware of what they are buying, but because it is treif they treat it as a normal meat.

The rub for us; the non-jews of this world, is two fold.

In the first instance we are not told that; even though it has been subject to ritual slaughter, this meat comes from kosher abattoirs/butchers although it not itself kosher. This means in effect that non-jews are paying jews for their waste meat products without knowing that they come from ritually slaughtered animals.

It is an obvious consumer rights issue that this meat should be packaged as such and indeed the scale of the problem is amply demonstrated when the Rabbinical Council of Europe asserted; in 2011, that if Shechita was banned then this would massively effect gentiles as well as the price of their meat would go up due to a significant constriction in its supply. In other words: jewish off-cuts and meat waste provide a significant amount of the meat that non-jews purchase and eat.

Further this same organisation asserted in the same article (43) that compulsory labels on packaging; telling the end consumers that their meat had been bought from kosher abattoirs/butchers and thus been ritually sacrificed rather than killed in the more ordinary way with say a bolt-gun, would massively reduce the income of kosher abattoirs/butchers, because people would stop buying it and companies wouldn't buy their off-cuts and waste meat any more.

Put another way: the jews make a lot of money from effectively fleecing consumers by not telling them that they are purchasing meat that has been subject to kashrut, but has been found wanting, which they clearly; if we are to believe the Rabbinical Council of Europe, want to know so they can make an informed decision not to purchase it!

In the second instance; that follows on nicely from the first, this money; which it is necessarily implied contains a significant amount of profit, is used by the kashrut certification organisations (who constantly supervise the kosher abattoirs/butchers) to fund jewish communal activities on a social, religious, cultural and political level via the donations process.

In effect then: when you purchase treif meat without realising it you are helping fund the jewish community and thus indirectly; considering how intimate Israel and the Diaspora are, the Israel Lobbies around the world.

Having thus dealt with these two necessary diversions we can conclude by recapping that the proverbial 'kosher food tax' is real, but that it is not a tax per but rather it is a gigantic ponzi scheme aimed at the corporate world that jews are operating, which rests solely on the belief in the myth of the eternally expanding market for kashrut products. Furthermore we have discussed and shown how this puts up prices for the end consumers, causes problems for corporations in general and funds jewish social, cultural, religious and political activities.

We have also demonstrated that the arguments leveled against the 'kosher food tax' thesis are without actual foundation and rest on a misunderstanding of kashrut, misrepresenting the 'kosher food tax' thesis and/or claiming statistics say something that; in fact, do not.

Thus we may say without equivocation: the Kosher Food Tax is real.


References

(40) http://www.radioislam.org/judaism/kosher.htm
(41) http://www.boycottwatch.org/misc/koshertax1.htm
(42) http://kosher-food.blogspot.com/2007/05 ... money.html
(43) http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340 ... 55,00.html

The Kosher Food Tax: How Boycott Watch and Snopes plagiarise the ADL

In my recent article series on the issue of the much misunderstood Kosher Food Tax theory; 'The Kosher Food Tax: Debunking the Debunkers', (1) I pointed out in passing that it is easy to locate a single genesis for most articles written about this subject by jewish and non-jewish debunkers. That genesis; as I originally alluded, can be found in the small pamphlet written and published by the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai Brith (the ADL), (2) which was itself written in response to Ed Fields' article on the subject in the June 1990 edition of his magazine: 'The Truth at Last'.

As I have long been inclined to intellectual skepticism as well as being a general critic of most 'skeptics'; who I have elsewhere styled as frequently irrational guardians of intellectual orthodoxy and not the daring researchers they self-identify as, (3) I think it is important to stress where skeptics have not only got it wrong, but haven't applied any critical thinking at all.

The controversy of the 'Kosher Food Tax' is an excellent case study in this kind of thinking precisely because it is the kind of subject that requires the skeptical inquirer; whether they like it or not, to put aside their personal intellectual prejudices (and lets face it we all have them) and look to see whether there is; in fact, a basis in the evidence for a highly controversial theory.

What; in fact, seems to have happened is very simple: in so far as the skeptical authors have come across a theory they don't like and/or are inclined to disregard; or as they would style it 'woo', that said their belief in skepticism dictates that they need to answer the claims in order to make sure their intellectual impression is correct. What has not happened however is the putting aside of ideologically-driven assumptions and what has occurred in its stead is that the skeptical authors have an ideologically-driven need to find a debunking argument.

In essence the skeptics have violated the cardinal rule of skepticism and conceived of their conclusion before they understand the arguments for and against. That then allows the skeptical authors to find some tit-bits of information and read a few internet articles on halakhah so they seem to know what they are talking about: (4) this then enables them; as skeptics are often quite bright, to write a seemingly well-reasoned 'debunk' of the Kosher Food Tax thesis.

However as I have observed in my debunk of these debunkers: they have not taken the time to understand all sides of the argument, have used Utopian assumptions (another cardinal intellectual sin) and have not performed sufficient original research into the issue itself to comment on it. I have remedied these factual errors; in summary and in select cases detail, in my original article.

In order to prove my contention regarding the uncritical acceptance of sources; such as the small ADL pamphlet on the subject, I will reproduce parts of the ADL pamphlet and then parallel claims from the two major skeptical hatchet jobs on the Kosher Food Tax thesis.

The ADL pamphlet states:

'Attacks on the labeling of food with the symbols for kashruth (traditional Jewish dietary laws) have been a standard ploy of anti-Jewish bigots in the U.S. for decades. Such symbols as the “U” emblem of the Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations (UOJC), among others, confirm that products are kosher—i.e., that foods and production processes have been inspected by competent rabbis from the respective organizations and found to be in compliance with Jewish dietary law.

[…]

Indeed, according to marketing manager Steven Zamichow, quoted in the Washington Post, "Entenmann's Inc. received kosher certification in 1981 and sales of [its] baked goods 'increased substantially.' " Visits to the Entenmann's plant from a "mashgiach" or kashruth inspector, are provided by the Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America. The UOJC is one of several groups that maintain such a kosher inspection service, certifying foods and related products to be in compliance with Jewish dietary laws through all phases of production. The profit from these products goes, of course, to the companies that manufacture them and the stores that sell them, not to "the Jews."' (5)

Compare this to the 'Boycott Watch' article's summary:

'First, the kosher symbols are certifications regarding the content of the products to inform consumers who are interested in abiding by kosher laws that the product is in fact kosher. This means that the product, in essence, contains no animal products as defined in the five books of Moses as non-clean, such as pig products or byproducts, and that the product does not contain both meat and dairy products in the same package.

[…]

Second, the fees associated with the kosher certifications do not aid any special groups or Israel. There is no money as part of the fees involved by any certification organization that is earmarked for Israel. Rather, the certification organizations, which are primarily non-profit entities, use the fees to pay the salaries of the rabbinical administrators and administrative expenses associated with the certification programs.' (6)

Now looking at the above we can can clearly see that the 'Boycott Watch' article is simply a reworded version of the section entitled 'The Facts' from the ADL pamphlet.

To highlight some of the specific instances of clear borrowing: we can note that the first point made by the 'Boycott Watch' article simply takes the explanation for the use of kashrut symbols from the ADL and re-words it in a summary. We can see this in that it literally adds nothing to the definition and doesn't even go as far as to explain; as the ADL article does not, that kashrut; and necessarily the Kosher Food Tax thesis, encompasses a lot more than merely rules around the consumption of meat and shellfish.

In essence the 'Boycott Watch' article makes an intellectual faux pas by assuming that Kashrut is just 'Jewish Dietary Law'; which is what the ADL article explicitly claims (and articles on Kashrut usually try to explain that this is only half-right) and nothing else. Indicating one of two things: either the author of the 'Boycott Watch' article knows very little about kashrut or they have simply reworded the paragraph from the ADL pamphlet.

In the second point made by the 'Boycott Watch' article: we can also see clear borrowing in its rephrasing and inversion of the claims made by the ADL pamphlet. For clarity's sake I reproduce the two passages side by side.

The ADL pamphlet:

'The UOJC is one of several groups that maintain such a kosher inspection service, certifying foods and related products to be in compliance with Jewish dietary laws through all phases of production. The profit from these products goes, of course, to the companies that manufacture them and the stores that sell them, not to "the Jews."'

Boycott Watch:

'Second, the fees associated with the kosher certifications do not aid any special groups or Israel. There is no money as part of the fees involved by any certification organization that is earmarked for Israel. Rather, the certification organizations, which are primarily non-profit entities, use the fees to pay the salaries of the rabbinical administrators and administrative expenses associated with the certification programs.'

We can see from the above that the ADL pamphlet talks about the kosher certification and inspection service as well as how this has no actual profit for the kashrut certification organisations at all. Indeed the 'Boycott Watch' article not very intelligently merely substitutes the term; 'Israel', for the ADL's preferred terminology: 'the jews'. The intended meaning is however identical in both cases with the assumption of a highly organised community significantly profiting from the profits of these kashrut certification organisations.

In essence we can see that the 'Boycott Watch' article makes exactly the same points as the ADL pamphlet and merely disguises this direct borrowing by inverting them and changing the language used a bit.

The scale of the borrowing in the 'Boycott Watch' article is even more obvious when we read the following phrase in it:

'The primary adherents to the kosher code are orthodox Jews, but many non-orthodox Jews, Muslims, vegetarians and other consumers prefer foods that are certified kosher.'

Compare this to the following paragraph from the ADL's pamphlet:

'Contrary to the anti-Semitic charge that kosher labeling is a tightly guarded "Jewish secret" kept from Christians and others, it is not only Jews who prefer to purchase kosher food. According to the Washington Post (Sept. 27, 1990), "Some kosher marketing officials estimate there may be as many as six million Americans who seek out Kosher foods in the supermarket. Of these only 1.5 million are Jewish. Moslems and Seventh Day Adventists also adhere to certain aspects of the Jewish dietary laws, but the bulk of Kosher shoppers appear to be consumers who believe the Kosher certification. . .means higher quality food."'

We can see here that the ADL article is clearly being used as a non-cited crib by the 'Boycott Watch' article precisely because this claim (of wide non-jewish usage) is first found in the ADL pamphlet and is; in itself, a very unusual claim to make because it assumes that Muslims, Seventh Day Adventists and others actively seek out kashrut certified food, which; as I pointed out in my original article, is simply not the case (or even imaginable to someone approaching this subject as a beginner).

This makes it very clear that the 'Boycott Watch' article is simply lifting its arguments and assumptions from the ADL pamphlet without attribution.

Further we may note with amusement that the author of the 'Boycott Watch' article clearly doesn't understand kashrut in the first place, because they state that 'the primary adherents to the kosher code are orthodox jews', which is a pretty extreme intellectual clanger.

This is because all forms of Judaism endorse kashrut; as it is direct from the Torah (rather than through the Mishnah and Gemara), hence it is required by all the major groups and sects of Judaism. Orthodoxy is only one of these and indeed the different sects have different levels of kashrut observance and accordingly tend to have their own kashrut certification groups with different levels of halakhic stringency.

Also one needs to ask: what on earth has being vegetarian got to do with actively consuming kashrut certified products (as the 'Boycott Watch' author claims)?

The solution to this conundrum indicates the ignorance of kashrut displayed by the article's author in that they are probably thinking of vegans (not vegetarians) and the kashrut certification of 'Parve' (lit. 'Neutral') meaning that there is no meat or milk in the product.

This unfortunately falls flat on its face as chicken and duck eggs for example are kosher, but are not considered meat or milk. Meaning that a kashrut designation of 'Parve' would be without utility for vegans, because it doesn't mirror their dietary requirements. In fact any vegan trying to do this would end up being a vegetarian in short order due to their consumption of animal-based produce.

We can thus see the 'Boycott Watch' article; which professes intellectual skepticism, shows nothing of the kind and uncritically borrows directly from the ADL pamphlet without attribution. Thus we must dismiss this article as a credible source as it is simply an unattributed rehash of the ADL pamphlet and is thus very misleading to the reader as well as lacking in intellectual rigor.

The other major 'debunker' article is the one at Snopes: the author of which; Barbara Mikkelson, actually understands what Kashrut is (in contrast to most detractors of the Kosher Food Tax thesis). Unfortunately Mikkelson; having given a reasonable short summary of the theory and practice involved in kashrut, also copies her 'debunking' arguments from the ADL pamphlet.

Compare the following quote from Mikkelson:

'Does certification add to the price of a product? Certainly, but the amount is minuscule, especially compared to the advertising, packaging, shipping, research, testing, admin and finance-related costs, and a myriad of other components that contribute to the process of bring a product to market or making it better appeal to customers.' (7)

To the ADL pamphlet:

'The cost to the consumer for this service is a miniscule fraction of the total production overhead; it is so negligible in practical terms as to be virtually non-existent.'

Now clearly Mikkelson is simply taking what the ADL pamphlet says verbatim and then rewording it into a skeptical summary.

To highlight the points of comparison to be aware of: we need to note the use of the term 'minuscule' by both Mikkelson and the ADL article in relation to the costs born by the firm; which is suggestive in itself, but when Mikkelson talks of the other costs of production. We can see clearly that she is simply paraphrasing the ADL pamphlet's claim about the kashrut costs being a 'minuscule fraction of the total production overhead' or in other words a tiny amount compared to all the other costs associated with production of a good (i.e. what Mikkelson states).

We can thus see that Mikkelson is drawing directly from the ADL's pamphlet and; like the 'Boycott Watch' article, she doesn't attribute that that is where she is getting her 'facts' from.

Mikkelson also gets the other central paragraph (i.e. the intellectual core of her 'debunk') of her Snopes article on the subject directly from the ADL pamphlet when she states thus:

'Those seeking kosher certification for their products have to adhere to kosher practices through the manufacturing process, use only kosher ingredients, and have their facilities regularly vetted by qualified inspectors. Kosher certification companies do charge for this service, which is the backbone of the “secret tax” claim – it costs money to obtain and maintain kosher certification, thus this is an extra expense a manufacturer must bear if he's determined upon having that certification. Where the rumor and reality part ways, however, is where the money goes. Fees paid to kosher certification companies go to keeping those businesses afloat with the profits siphoned off by those companies' owners; they do not flow off into some special Jewish fund used to advance Zionist causes.'

Compare this to the ADL pamphlet:

'The UOJC is one of several groups that maintain such a kosher inspection service, certifying foods and related products to be in compliance with Jewish dietary laws through all phases of production. The profit from these products goes, of course, to the companies that manufacture them and the stores that sell them, not to "the Jews."'

We can clearly see in the above passages that Mikkelson; like the author of the 'Boycott Watch' article, is using the ADL pamphlet as a non-referenced source and factual crib. Mikkelson has simply; once again, reworded the ADL's paragraph rather than make an original argument. We can see that like the ADL pamphlet she talks of the kosher inspection service and then proceeds to near enough quote the ADL's claim that the profit goes to companies not the jewish community.

Once again Mikkelson; like the author of the 'Boycott Watch' article, changes the ADL's preferred terminology of 'the jews' to 'Zionist causes'; directly parallel to the 'Boycott Watch' article's use of 'Israel', in her statement, but once again the meaning is exactly the same.

Thus one can see that Mikkelson has; apart from giving a reasonable summary of the theory and practice involved in kashrut, actually copies; without mention or citation, the ADL's pamphlet on the subject.

Thus; like article at 'Boycott Watch', we must dismiss Mikkelson's article at Snopes as it offers no original argument against the Kosher Food Tax thesis and simply uncritically repeats the claims the of the ADL's pamphlet without any apparent factual check or critical examination whatsoever.

From this we can now see that one of the problems with skepticism; certainly as an intellectual label anyway, is that it is too often used in the vein of how the term 'scientist' was utilized from the nineteenth century to mid-late twentieth century. In so far as it is a catch-all self-identification with rationality and having a large amount of evidence, but it does not necessarily invoke the rigorous intellectual method that both science (repeatable empirical evidence) and skepticism (the minimalist interpretation accounting for all of the evidence) have at their core.

Instead the term 'skeptic'; like the term 'scientist', is used as a positive rhetorical characterisation (in most cases as it can and is used sometimes as a negative characterisation) to claim; by implied extension, that the assertion made inevitably flow from the most stringent of all intellectual methodologies available.

In essence; as we have seen with 'Boycott Watch' and Mikkelson, the profession of skepticism is often simply an intellectual smokescreen to hide a lack of originality and conclusions made a priori.

After all can we to assume that an honest and non-partisan researcher would all but quote the ADL's pamphlet without citing or mentioning doing so (let alone showing due criticality to its claims)?

The fact that the author of the 'Boycott Watch' article and Barbara Mikkelson did what they did speaks volumes I think!


References

(1) http://semiticcontroversies.blogspot.co ... ers_4.html
(2) http://www.adl.org/special_reports/kosher_tax/print.asp
(3) http://semiticcontroversies.blogspot.co ... -anti.html
(4) A great example is: http://www.boycottwatch.org/misc/koshertax1.htm
(5) http://www.adl.org/special_reports/kosher_tax/print.asp
(6) http://www.boycottwatch.org/misc/koshertax1.htm
(7) http://www.snopes.com/racial/business/kosher.asp