Hello Folks,
All good points, RB.
Dr. Pierce's Cosmotheism is
the real panacea destroying
the alien and Jewish ideological
and spiritual plagues that do threaten
our own White racial survival and advancement up
towards Godhood. Cosmotheism is White racialist and/or White biocentric panentheism.
======================================================================================================
Panentheism
First published Thu Dec 4, 2008
; substantive revision Tue Feb 5, 2013
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/panentheism/
“Panentheism” is a constructed word composed
of the English equivalents
of the Greek terms “pan”, meaning all, “en”, meaning in, and “theism”, meaning God. Panentheism considers God and
the world to be inter-related with
the world being in God and God being in
the world. It offers an increasingly popular alternative to both traditional theism and pantheism. Panentheism seeks to avoid either isolating God from
the world as traditional theism often does or identifying God with
the world as pantheism does. Traditional theistic systems emphasize
the difference between God and
the world while panentheism stresses God's active presence in
the world. Pantheism emphasizes God's presence in
the world but panentheism maintains
the identity and significance
of the non-divine. Anticipations
of panentheistic understandings
of God have occurred in both philosophical and theological writings throughout history (Hartshorne and Reese 1953; Cooper, 2006). However, a rich diversity
of panentheistic understandings has developed in
the past two centuries primarily in Christian traditions responding to scientific thought (Clayton and Peacocke 2004). While panentheism generally emphasizes God's presence in
the world without losing
the distinct identity
of either God or
the world, specific forms
of panenethism, drawing from a different sources, explain
the nature
of the relationship
of God to
the world in a variety
of ways and come to different conclusions about
the significance
of the world for
the identity
of God.
1. Terminology
2. History
3. Contemporary Expressions
4. Criticisms and Responses
Bibliography
Academic Tools
Other Internet Resources
Related Entries
1. Terminology
Because modern “panentheism” developed under
the influence
of German Idealism, Whiteheadian process philosophy, and current scientific thought, panentheists employ a variety
of terms with meanings that have specialized content.
Theological terms as understood by panentheists:
1. Classical or Traditional Theism
The understanding that ultimate reality is a being which is distinct from
the world and any other reality. This distinction often develops into an ontological separation between God and
the world that makes any interaction between God and
the world problematic.
2. Pantheism
A type
of theism that stresses
the identity
of God and
the world ontologically. This identity is expressed in different manifestations so distinctions can be made, but
the distinctions are temporary. There is often a strong sense
of necessity in God's creation
of the world so that God as God must express deity in creation.
3. Transcendence
Generally, God's externality to
the world so that God is unlimited by any other being or reality. Hegel and then Hartshorne understand transcendence as including all that is in order to avoid any reality external to God that limits God.
4. Immanence
God's presence and activity within
the world. Panentheists assert that traditional theism limits its affirmation
of God's immanence by understanding immanence as
the transcendent presence
of the supernatural Being within
the natural realm. When this divine presence is understood as distinctly transcendent, God's presence and activity within
the world as natural is an intervention
of the supernatural within
the natural. God, then, is absent from
the natural except in specific cases
of intervention.
5. Kenosis
Divine self-emptying, or withdrawal,
of infinite being while present in
the world.
Terms influenced by
the German Idealism
of Hegel and Schelling:
1. Dialectic
The presence
of contradictory realities where
the contradiction is overcome by including elements from each
of the contradictory elements in a synthesis that is more than
the combination
of each member
of the contradiction. Whitehead's understanding
of God's redemption
of evil by placing an evil event in
the context
of good events expresses a similar understanding although he is not as explicit as Hegel in understanding all
of reality as a dialectical development.
2. Perichoresis
The ontological intermingling
of the members
of the Trinity so that
the Father is part
of the Son and
the Spirit,
the Son part
of the Spirit and Father, and
the Spirit part
of the Father and Son. Moltmann utilizes this concept to describe
the presence
of God in
the world and
the world in God.
Terms influenced by Whiteheadian process philosophy:
1. Internal and External Relations
Internal relations are relations that affect
the being
of the related beings. External relations do not change
the basic nature or essence
of a being. For panentheism,
the relationship between God and
the world is an internal relationship in that God affects
the nature
of the world and
the world changes
the nature
of God. Classical theism affirms an external relationship between God and
the world in that God responds to events in
the world but those events do not change God's essence, necessary existence, or basic nature.
2. Dipolar
Refers especially to God as having two basic aspects. Schelling identified these aspects as necessary and contingent. Whitehead referred to God's primordial and consequent natures meaning that God has an eternal nature and a responsive nature. Whitehead understood all reality to be dipolar in that each event includes both physical and mental aspects in opposition to a mind-body dualism. Hartshorne identified these aspects as abstract and concrete.
Terms related to current scientific thought:
1. Reductionism
All
of reality is one type
of existence. Ordinarily reductionism holds that all
of reality can be explained by using only physical, sub-atomic, entities. Any reference to a higher being or cause results from a lack
of information about
the physical entities that are involved. Modern reductionism denies
the existence
of mental realities as a separate type
of existence. Panentheism critiques reductionism as an oversimplification
of reality and
the experience
of reality.
2. Supervenience
One reality arises out
of another reality. For example, mental activity arises out
of physical reality. While reductionistic understandings agree that supervenience occurs, reductionistic supervenience maintains that there are consistent principles that function in
the same way at both levels. Panentheists generally understand supervenience to give rise to new principles that are effective at one level but not present at
the simpler level.
3. Emergence
Emergence, as
the process involved in supervenience, occurs when a new property arises out
of a combination
of elements.
The traditional example is that water emerges out
of the combination
of oxygen and hydrogen atoms in certain proportions. There are a variety
of types
of emergence that have been identified. In part-whole emergence,
the whole is more than
the total
of all
the parts (Corning 2002). Strong emergence understands evolution to produce new and ontologically distinct levels characterized by their own laws or regularities and causal forces. Weak emergence holds that
the new level follows
the fundamental causal processes
of physics (Clayton 2004, 9). Strong emergence is also known as ontological emergence and weak as epistemological emergence.
4. Top-Down Causation
More complex levels
of objects or events affect less complex elements. Causation is ordinarily understood as being from
the bottom-up meaning from
the simple to
the complex. Physical elements cause other, often more complex, objects or events. A common example
of top-down causation is
the effect
of thought upon a person's body. Scientists heatedly debate
the possibility
of top-down causation (Davies 2006).
5. Entanglement
In quantum theory,
the correlation
of two particles that originate in a single event even though separated from each other by significant distance. Entangled objects behave in ways that cannot be predicted on
the basis
of their individual properties.
The impossibility
of prediction can be understood epistemically if behavior is considered
the result
of an average
of many similar measurements or ontologically if behavior results from
the existence
of the world in an indefinite state prior to measurement. Both Bohr's indeterministic and Bohm's deterministic understandings
of quantum theory accept this relational understanding
of physical processes. Understanding
the world as persistent relationships as well as separation provides a model based in science for understanding God's relation to
the world. God's influence can be present at
the level
of individual events although this entanglement would remain hidden from a local perspective. However,
the implications
of entanglement for concepts
of causality become even more complex when considering
the relation between God and
the world. Polkinghorne suggests that causality may be active information rather than an exchange
of energy (2010, 9).
Although numerous meanings have been attributed to
the “in” in panentheism (Clayton 2004, 253),
the more significant meanings are:
1. Locative meaning
Location that is included in a broader location. For example, something may be located in a certain part
of a certain room. Such a meaning is problematic in reference to God because
of the common understanding that God is not limited by spatial categories. If spatial categories do not apply to God in ordinary usage, to say something is located in God becomes problematic. “In” then takes on special meanings with metaphysical content or as an analogy for God's relationship to
the world.
2. Metaphysical basis for being
Beings come into existence and continue to exist due to
the presence
of divine Being.
The concept
of participation often includes
the understanding that
the world comes into being and continues to exist through taking part in God's Being (Clayton 2008, 118–119).
3. Metaphysical-Epistemological basis for being
Presence in God provides both identity and being. Karl Krause's panentheism asserted a metaphysical structure that involved both how an entity differs from other entities (epistemological identity) and what it is in itself (ontological status) (Göcke 2013).
4. Metaphysical interactive potential
Active indeterminacy
of commingling unpredictable development
of self-organizing relations derived from prior actualizations (Keller 2003, 219).
5. Emergence metaphor
A more complex entity comes from at least a partial source.
6. Mind/Body analogical meaning
The mind provides structure and direction to
the organization
of the organism
of the body.
The world is God's body in
the sense that
the world actualizes God and manifests God while being directed by God as different from
the world. Many, but not all, panentheists utilize
the mind/body analogy to describe
the God/world relation in a manner that emphasizes
the immanence
of God without loss
of God's transcendence.
7. Part/Whole analogical meaning
A particular exists in relation to something that is greater and different from any and all
of its parts.
The world is in God by participating in God's being and action.
2. History
Although Panentheism lacked a clear label in philosophical and religious reflection about God until Karl Krause's (1781–1832) creation
of the term in
the Eighteenth century (Gregersen 2004, 28), various advocates and critics
of panentheism find evidence
of incipient or implicit forms
of panentheism present in religious thought as early as 1300 BCE. Hartshorne discovers
the first indication
of panentheistic themes in Ikhnaton (1375–1358 BCE),
the Egyptian pharaoh often considered
the first monotheist. In his poetic description
of the sun god, Ikhnaton avoids both
the separation
of God from
the world that will characterize traditional theism and
the identification
of God with
the world that will characterize pantheism (Hartshorne 1953, 29–30). Early Vedantic thought implies panentheism in non-Advaita forms that understand non-dualism as inclusive
of differences. Although there are texts referring to Brahman as contracted and identical to Brahman, other texts speak
of Brahman as expanded. In these texts,
the perfect includes and surpasses
the total
of imperfect things as an appropriation
of the imperfect. Although not
the dominant interpretation
of the Upanishads, multiple intimations
of panentheism are present in
the Upanishads (Whittemore 1988, 33, 41–44). Hartshorne finds additional religious concepts
of God that hold
the unchanging and
the changing together in a way that allows for
the development and significance
of the non-divine in Lao-Tse (fourth century BCE) and in
the Judeo-Christian scriptures (1953, 32–38).
In philosophical reflection, Plato (427/428–348/347 BCE) plays a role in
the development
of implicit panentheism although there is disagreement about
the nature
of that role. Hartshorne drew a dipolar understanding
of God that includes both immutability and mutability from Plato. Hartshorne understood Plato's concept
of the divine to include
the Forms as pure and unchanging being and
the World soul as changing and in motion. Although he concluded that Plato never reconciled these two elements in his understanding
of the divine, both aspects were present (1953, 54). Cooper, instead, thinks that Plato retained an essential distinction between
the Good and
the other beings that Plato called gods. According to Cooper, Plotinus (204–270 CE) rather than Plato provided
the basis for panentheism with his description
of the physical world as an emanation
of being from
the One making
the world part
of the Ultimate (2006, 35–39). Baltzly finds evidence in
the Timaeus
of a polytheistic view that can be identified as panentheistic (2010).
From Plato to Schelling (1775–1854 CE), various theologians and philosophers developed ideas that are similar to themes in contemporary panentheism. These ideas developed as expressions
of traditional theism. Proclus (412–485 CE) and Pseudo-Dionysus (late Fifth to early Sixth century) drawing upon Plotinus developed perspectives that included
the world in God and understood
the relationship between God and
the world as a dialectical relationship (Cooper 2006, 42–46). In
the Middle Ages,
the influence
of Neoplatonism continued in
the thought
of Eriugena (815–877 CE), Eckhart (1260–1328 CE), Nicholas
of Cusa (1401–1464 CE), and Boehme (1575–1624 CE). Although accused
of pantheism by their contemporaries, their systems can be identified as panentheistic because they understood God in various ways as including
the world rather than being
the world and because they used a dialectical method.
The dialectical method involved
the generation
of opposites and then
the reconciliation
of the opposition in God. This retained
the distinct identity
of God in God's influence
of the world (Cooper 2006, 47–62). During
the early modern period, Bruno (1548–1600 CE) and Spinoza (1631–1677 CE) responded to
the dualism
of traditional theism by emphasizing
the relationship between God and
the world to
the point that
the nature
of any ontological distinction between God and
the world became problematic. Later thinkers such as
the Cambridge Platonists (Seventeenth century), Jonathan Edwards (1703–1758 CE) (Crisp 2009), and Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768–1834 CE) thought
of the world as in some way in God or a development from God. Although they did not stress
the ontological distinction between God and
the world, they did emphasize
the responsive relationship that humans have to God. Human responsiveness assumed some degree
of human initiative if not freedom, which indicates some distinction between God and humans.
The assumption
of some degree
of human initiative was a reaction against
the loss
of freedom due to Spinoza's close identification between God and
the world (Cooper 2006, 64–90).
The nineteenth and twentieth centuries saw
the development
of panentheism as a specific position regarding God's relationship to
the world.
The awareness
of panentheism as an alternative to theism and pantheism developed out
of a complex
of approaches. Philosophical idealism and philosophical adaptation
of the scientific concept
of evolution provided
the basic sources
of the explicit position
of panentheism. Philosophical approaches applying
the concept
of development to God reached their most complete expression in process philosophy's understanding
of God being affected by
the events
of the world.
Hegel (1770–1831) and Schelling (1775–1854) sought to retain
the close relationship between God and
the world that Spinoza proposed without identifying God with
the world. Their concept
of God as developing in and through
the world provided
the means for accomplishing this. Prior to this time, God had been understood as unchanging and
the world as changing while existing in God (Cooper 2006, 90). Schelling's understanding
of God as personal provided
the basis for
the unity
of the diversity in
the world in a manner that was more open than Hegel's understanding. Schelling emphasized
the freedom
of the creatures in relation to
the necessity
of God's nature as love. For Schelling, God's free unfolding
of God's internal subjective necessity did not result in an external empirical necessity determining
the world (Clayton 2000, 474). This relationship resulted in vitality and on-going development. Hartshorne classified this as a dipolar understanding
of God in that God is both necessary and developing (1953, 234). Cooper describes Schelling's thought as dynamic cooperative panentheism (2006, 95). Hegel found Schelling inadequate and sought a greater unity for
the diversity. He united Fichte's subjective idealism and Schelling's objective idealism to provide a metaphysics
of subjectivity rather than substance (Clayton 2008, 125. Hegel's unification
of Fichte and Schelling resulted in a more comprehensive and consistent system still based upon change in God. God as well as nature is characterized by dialectical development. In his rejection
of pantheism, Hegel understood
the infinite as including
the finite by absorbing
the finite into its own fuller nature. This retained divine transcendence in
the sense
of the divine surpassing its parts although not separate from
the parts (Whittemore 1960, 141–142).
The divine transcendence provided unity through
the development
of the Absolute through history. Karl Krause (1781–1832) in 1828 labeled Schelling's and Hegel's positions as “panentheism” in order to emphasize their differences from Spinoza's identification
of God with
the world (Reese 2008, 1). Cooper describes Hegel's panentheism as dialectical historical panentheism (2006, 107).
As Darwin's theory
of evolution introduced history into
the conceptualization
of biology, Samuel Alexander (1859–1938), Henri Bergson (1859–1941), and C. Lloyd Morgan (1852–1936) introduced development into
the ways in which all
of physical reality was conceptualized. They then worked out positions that in a variety
of ways understood God and
the world as growing in relationship to each other. Although Hartshorne's classification
of “panentheism” did not include Alexander in
the category
of “panentheism,” only occasionally mentioned Bergson, and made no reference to Morgan, Whitehead referred to all three
of these thinkers positively. Although it may be too strong to claim that they influenced Whitehead (Emmett 1992), they did provide
the background for Whitehead's and then Hartshorne's systematic development
of process philosophy as an expression
of panentheism. Hartshorne popularized
the modern use
of the term “panentheism” and considered Whitehead to be
the outstanding panentheist (Hartshorne 1953, 273). Although Hartshorne made several modifications to Whitehead's understanding
of God,
the basic structures
of Whitehead's thought were continued in Hartshorne's further development
of Whitehead's philosophy (Ford 1973, Cobb, 1965). God, for process philosophy, is necessary for any actual world. Without God,
the world would be nothing more than a static, unchanging existence radically different from
the actual world
of experience. God as both eternal and temporal provides possibilities that call
the world to change and develop. God as eternal provides an actual source
of those possibilities. However, if God is only eternal,
the possibilities would be unrelated to
the actual world as it presently exists. Thus, Whitehead and Hartshorne understand
the world to be present in God in order for
the possibilities that lead to development to be related to
the world (Hartshorne 1953, 273).
The implication
of God's inclusion
of the world is that God is present to
the world and
the world influences God. Although
the presence
of the world in God could be understood as a form
of pantheism, process philosophy avoids collapsing
the world into God or God into
the world by maintaining a distinction between God and
the world. This distinction is manifest in
the eternality
of God and
the temporality
of the world. It is also apparent in
the freedom
of the events in
the world. Although God presents possibilities to
the events in
the world, each event “decides” how it will actualize those possibilities.
The freedom
of each event,
the absence
of divine determination, provides a way for process thought to avoid God being
the cause
of evil or containing evil as evil. Since God includes
the events
of the world, God will include
the evil as well as
the good that occurs in
the world and this evil will affect God since
the world affects God's actualization. But, because God does not determine
the response
of each event to
the possibilities that God presents, any event may reject God's purpose
of good through
the intensification
of experience and actualize a less intense experience. God does take this less intense, evil, experience into God's self, but redeems that evil by means
of relating it to
the ways in which good has been actualized. Thus, God saves what can be saved from
the world rather than simply including each event in isolation from other events (Cooper 2006, 174, 180).
3. Recent Developments
Protestant theologians have contributed to recent developments
of panentheism by continuing
the German Idealist tradition or
the tradition
of process philosophy. Although
the majority
of the contemporary expressions
of panentheism involve scientists and protestant theologians or philosophers, articulations
of forms
of panentheism have developed among feminists, in
the Roman Catholic tradition, in
the Orthodox tradition, and in religions other than Christianity.
Utilizing resources from
the tradition
of German Idealism, Jürgen Moltmann developed a form
of panentheism in his early work,
The Crucified God in 1974 (1972 for
the German original), where he said that
the suffering and renewal
of all humanity are taken into
the life
of the Triune God. He explicated his understanding
of panentheism more fully in
The Trinity and
the Kingdom in 1981. Theological concerns motivate Moltmann's concept
of panentheism. Panentheism avoids
the arbitrary concept
of creation held by traditional theism and
the loss
of creaturely freedom that occurs in Christian pantheism (Cooper 2006, 248). Moltmann understands panentheism to involve both God in
the world and
the world in God.
The relationship between God and
the world is like
the relationship among
the members
of the Trinity in that it involves relationships and communities (Molnar 1990, 674). Moltmann uses
the concept
of perichoresis to describe this relationship
of mutual interpenetration. By using
the concept
of perichoresis, Moltmann moves away from a Hegelian understanding
of the trinity as a dialectical development in history (Cooper 2006, 251).
The relationship between God and
the world develops because
of God's nature as love that seeks
the other and
the free response
of the other (Molnar 1990, 677). Moltmann does not consider creation necessary for God nor
the result
of any inner divine compulsion. Instead creation is
the result
of God's essential activity as love rather than
the result
of God's self-determination (Molnar, 1990, 679). This creation occurs in a process
of interaction between nothingness and creativity, contraction and expansion, in God. Because there is no “outside”
of God due to God's infinity, God must withdraw in order for creation to exist. Kenosis, or God's self-emptying, occurs in creation as well as in
the incarnation.
The nothing in
the doctrine
of “creation from nothing” is
the primordial result
of God's contraction
of God's essential infinity (Cooper, 2006, 247). Moltmann finds that panentheism as mutual interpenetration preserves unity and difference in a variety
of differences in kind such as God and human being, person and nature, and
the spiritual and
the sensuous (Moltmann, 1996, 307).
Utilizing process philosophy, David Ray Griffin assumes that scientific understandings
of the world are crucial and recognizes
the implications
of scientific understanding for theology. However, his concept
of panentheism builds on
the principles
of process philosophy rather than scientific concepts directly. Griffin traces modern atheism to
the combination
of understanding perception as exclusively based on physical sensations, accepting a naturalistic explanation
of reality, and identifying matter as
the only reality. But,
the emergence
of mind challenges
the adequacy
of this contemporary worldview (2004, 40–41). He claims that
the traditional supernaturalistic form
of theism with its emphasis upon
the divine will does not provide an adequate alternative to
the atheism
of the late modern worldview because God becomes
the source
of evil. Griffin argues that traditional theism makes God
the source
of evil because God's will establishes
the general principles
of the universe (2004, 37). Process panentheism provides a way to avoid
the problems
of both traditional theism and materialistic naturalism (2004, 42). Griffin substitutes panexperientialism for materialism and a doctrine
of perception that bases sensory perception on a non-sensory mode
of perception in order to explain both
the mind-body interaction and
the God-world interaction. God is numerically distinct from
the world but is ontologically
the same avoiding dualism and supernaturalism. God and events in
the world interact through non-sensory perception (2004, 44–45). Through this interaction, God can influence but not determine
the world, and
the world can influence God's concrete states without changing God's essence. Process panentheism recognizes two aspects
of the divine, an abstract and unchanging essence and a concrete state that involves change. Through this dipolar concept, God both influences and is influenced by
the world (2004, 43–44). Griffin understands God as essentially
the soul
of the universe although distinct from
the world.
The idea
of God as
the soul
of the world stresses
the intimacy and direct relationship
of God's relationship to
the world, not
the emergence
of the soul from
the world (2004, 44). Relationality is part
of the divine essence, but this does not mean that this specific world is necessary to God. This world came into existence from relative nothingness. This relative nothingness was a chaos that lacked any individual that sustained specific characteristics over time. However, even in
the chaos prior to
the creation
of this world, events had some degree
of self-determination and causal influence upon subsequent events. These fundamental causal principles along with God exist naturally since these causal principles are inherent in things that exist including
the nature
of God.
The principles cannot be broken because such an interruption would be a violation
of God's nature. An important implication
of the two basic causal principles, a degree
of self-determination and causal influence, is that God influences but does not determine other events (2004, 43). Griffin's understanding
of naturalism allows for divine action that is formally
the same in all events. But this divine action can occur in a variable manner so that some acts are especially revelatory
of the divine character and purpose (2004, 45).
Much
of the contemporary discussion and development
of panentheism occurs in
the context
of the science and religion discussion.
The early modern concept
of an unchanging natural order posed a challenge to understandings
of divine action in
the world.
The current discussion draws on
the development
of scientific information about
the natural world that can contribute to religious efforts to explain how God acts in
the world. In
the contemporary discussion, Arthur Peacocke and Paul Davies have made important contributions as scientists interested in, and knowledgeable about, religion. Peacocke developed his understanding
of panentheism beginning in 1979 and continuing through works in 2001, 2004, and 2006. Peacocke starts with
the shift in
the scientific understanding
of the world from a mechanism to
the current understandings
of the world as a unity composed
of complex systems in a hierarchy
of different levels. These emergent levels do not become different types
of reality but instead compose a unity that can be understood naturally as an emergentist monism. At
the same time,
the different levels
of complexity cannot be reduced to an explanation
of one type or level
of complexity.
The creative dynamic
of the emergence
of complexity in hierarchies is immanent in
the world rather than external to
the world (Peacocke 2004, 137–142). Similarly, Paul Davies describes
the universe by talking about complexity and higher levels
of organization in which participant observers bring about a more precise order (2007). An important scientific aspect
of this concept
of complexity and organization is
the notion
of entanglement especially conceptual level entanglement (Davies 2006, 45–48). Again,
the organization, which makes life possible, is an internal, or natural, order rather than an order imposed from outside
of the universe (Davies 2004). Peacocke draws upon this contemporary scientific understanding
of the universe to think about
the relationship between God and
the natural world. He rejects any understanding
of God as external to nature whether it is a traditional theistic understanding where God intervenes in
the natural world or a deistic understanding where God initiates
the natural world but does not continue to be active in
the world. For Peacocke, God continuously creates through
the processes
of the natural order. God's active involvement is not an additional, external influence upon events. However, God is not identified with
the natural processes, which are
the action
of God as Creator (Peacocke 2004, 143–144). Peacocke identifies his understanding
of God's relation to
the world as panentheism because
of its rejection
of dualism and external interactions by God in favor
of God always working from inside
the universe. At
the same time, God transcends
the universe because God is infinitely more than
the universe. This panentheistic model combines a stronger emphasis upon God's immanence with God's ultimate transcendence over
the universe by using a model
of personal agency (Peacocke 2004, 147–151). Davies also refers to his understanding
of the role
of laws in nature as panentheism rather than deism because God chose laws that give a co-creative role to nature (2004, 104).
Philip Clayton begins with contemporary scientific understandings
of the world and combines them with theological concepts drawn from a variety
of sources including process theology. He describes God's relationship with
the world as an internal rather than an external relationship. Understanding God's relationship as internal to
the world recognizes
the validity
of modern scientific understandings that do not require any external source in order to account for
the order in
the world. At
the same time, God's internal presence provides
the order and regularity that
the world manifests (2001, 208–210). Clayton agrees that
the world is in God and God is in
the world. Panentheism, according to him, affirms
the interdependence
of God and
the world (2004b, 83). This affirmation became possible as a result
of the rejection
of substantialistic language, which excludes all other beings from any one being. Rejection
of substantialistic language thus allows for
the interaction
of beings. Clayton cites Hegel's recognition that
the logic
of the infinite requires
the inclusion
of the finite in
the infinite and points towards
the presence
of the world in God (Clayton 2004b, 78–79). Clayton, along with Joseph Bracken (1974, 2004), identifies his understanding
of panentheism as Trinitarian and kenotic (Clayton 2005, 255). It is Trinitarian because
the world participates in God in a manner analogous to
the way that members
of the trinity participate in each other although
the world is not and does not become God. God freely decides to limit God's infinite power in an act
of kenosis in order to allow for
the existence
of non-divine reality.
The divine kenotic decision results in
the actuality
of the world that is taken into God. But, for Clayton, God's inclusion
of finite being as actual is contingent upon God's decision rather than necessary to God's essence (2003, 214). Clayton affirms creation from nothing as a description
of creaturely existence prior to God's decision.
The involvement
of the world in an internal relationship with God does not completely constitute
the divine being for Clayton. Instead, God is both primordial, or eternal, and responsive to
the world.
The world does constitute God's relational aspect but not
the totality
of God (2005, 250–254).
The best way to describe
the interdependence between God and
the world for Clayton is through
the concept
of emergence. Emergence may be explanatory, epistemological, or ontological. Ontological understandings
of emergence, which Clayton supports, hold that 1) reality is made up one type
of being, physical existence, rather than two or more types
of being but this physicality does not mean that only physical objects exist because, 2) properties emerge in objects from
the potentiality
of an object that cannot be previously identified in
the object's parts or structure, 3)
the emergence
of new properties give rise to distinct levels
of causal relations, which leads to 4) downward causation
of the emergent level upon prior levels (2006a, 2–4). Emergence recognizes that change is important to
the nature
of the world and challenges static views
of God (Clayton 2006b, 320).
A number
of feminist contribute to
the development
of panentheism by critiquing traditional understandings
of transcendence for continuing dualistic ways
of thinking. Feminist panentheists conceive
of the divine as continuous with
the world rather than being ontologically transcendent over
the world (Frankenberry 2011). Sallie McFague's use
of metaphors in both theology and science led her to describe
the world as God's body. McFague bases
the metaphorical nature
of all statements about God upon panenethiesm (2001, 30). Further more, for McFague, panentheism sees
the world as in God which puts God's name first but includes each person's name and preserves their distinctiveness in
the divine reality (2001, 5). God's glory becomes manifest in God's total self-giving to
the world so that transcendence becomes immanence rather than being understood as God's power manifest in distant control
of the world. Grace Jantzen also uses
the metaphor
of the world as God's body. Additionally, Jantzen (1998) and Schaab (2007) have proposed metaphors about
the womb and midwifery to describe God's relation to
the world. Anna Case–Winters challenges McFague's metaphor
of the world as God's body. Case–Winters acknowledges that his metaphor maintains God's personal nature, offers a coherent way to talk about God's knowledge
of and action in
the world, recognizes God's vulnerable suffering love, and revalues nature and embodiment. But at least McFague's early use
of the world-as-God's-body metaphor tended towards pantheism and even her later introduction
of an agential role for
the divine still retains
the possibility
of the loss
of the identity
of the world. Case–Winters uses McDaniel's (1989) distinction between emanational and relationsal understandings
of God's immanence in
the world to establish a form
of panentheism with a clearer distinction between God and
the world.
The world is an “other” in relation to God rather than being a direct expression
of God's own being through emanation for Case–Winters (30–32). Frankenberry contrasts McFague's and Case–Winter's two concepts
of transcendence to
the traditional hierarchical concept
of transcendence. McFague's concept is one
of total immanence while Case–Winters holds a dialectic between individual transcendence and immanence (2011). Frankenberry suggests that pantheism may provide a more direct repudiation
of male domination than panentheism provides (1993).
The feminist discussion about
the adequacy
of the metaphor
of the world as God's body plays a role in
the broader panentheistic discussion about how to describe
the relationship between God and
the world and
the adequacy
of the specific metaphors that have been used. Many panentheists find that metaphors provide
the most adequate way to understand God's relation to
the world. McFague argues that any attempt to do theology requires
the use
of metaphor (2001, 30). Clayton proposes different levels
of metaphor as
the most adequate way to reconcile
the conflict between divine action and
the integrity
of the created realm (2003, 208). For Peacocke,
the limitation
of language requires
the use
of models and metaphors in describing either God or
the cosmos (Schabb 2008, 13).
The dominant metaphor in panentheism has been
the world as God's body.
The primary objection to
the world as God's body is
the substantialistic implications
of the term “body” that lead either to an ontological separation between
the world and God or to a loss
of identity for God or
the world. Bracken proposes a Trinitarian field theory to explain
the world's presence in God.
The world is a large but finite field
of activity within
the all–comprehensive field
of activity constituted by
the three divine persons in ongoing relations with each other and with all
the creation (2009, 159). Bracken accepts that other metaphors have been utilized but concludes that
the world as God's body and field theory have proven
the most helpful. However, more clearly metaphysical panentheistic understandings
of God's relation to
the world have been articulated. Schelling's German Idealism understood God as freely unfolding as emanation by introducing subjectivity. There is no ontological separation between God and
the world because
the world participates in
the infinite as its source (Clayton 2000, 477–481). Krause understood
the world's participation in God both ontologically and epistemically.
The particularity
of each existent being depends upon
the Absolute for its existence as what it is (Göcke 2013).
The metaphysical concept
of participation occurs as a description
of world's relation to God but lacks precision and can be understood either metaphorically or literally. Keller offers another metaphysical understanding by arguing for creation out
of chaos. She rejects substance metaphysics and describes
the relation between God and
the world as a complex relationality involving an active indeterminacy and past realities (2003, 219). Finally
the science and religion discussion provides another metaphysical understanding by drawing upon scientific concepts such as supervenience, emergence, downward causation, and entanglement to provide a ground for theological concepts explaining God's relation to
the world.
Although most
of the advocates for panentheism work in
the context
of Christian belief or responses to Christian belief, indications
of panentheism in other religions have been recognized especially in
the Vedic tradition. Hartshorne in his discussion
of panentheism included a section on Hinduism (1953).
The concept
of the world as
the body
of the divine offers a strong similarity to Western panentheism.
The Gita identifies
the whole world, including all
the gods and living creatures, as
the Divine body. But
the Divine Being has its own body that contains
the world while being more than
the world. While
the Upanishads acknowledge
the body
of the Divine at times,
the body
of the divine is never identified as
the cosmos. Most
of the Tantrics hold a pantheistic view in which
the practitioner is a manifestation
of the divine. Abhinavagupta, in
the tenth century, provided
the first panentheistic understanding
of the world as God's body. For him, differentiation is Shiva concealing his wholeness. Abhinavagupta also insisted that Shiva transcends
the cosmos (Bilimoria and Stansell 2010, 244–258). Abhinavagupta and Hartshorne think
of the Divine as immanent in
the world and as changing but they understood God's mutability in different ways (Stansell and Phillips 2010, 187). Ramunuja in
the twelfth century also considered
the world to be God's body and
the thoughts
of ultimate reality, individual selves, and
the cosmos as identical (Ward 2004, 62 and Clayton 2010, 187–189).
4. Criticisms and Responses
In spite
of more than one hundred years
of development, panentheism continues to grow and change. Much
of this growth has taken place as a result
of advances in science. Another impetus for change has been criticisms raised by
the major alternatives to panentheistic understandings
of the God-world relation. Panentheism faces challenges both from those who find that any lessening
of the emphasis upon divine transcendence to be inadequate and from those who find some form
of pantheism more adequate than any distinction between God and
the world. Finally,
the variety
of the versions
of panentheism have led to an active internal discussion among
the various versions.
Both pantheists and scientists working with naturalist assumptions criticize panentheism for its metaphysical claim that there is a being above or other than
the natural world. At times, this criticism has been made by claiming that a thorough-going naturalism does not need a transcendent, individualized reality. Corrington describes
the development
of his thought as a growing awareness that panentheism unnecessarily introduces a being above nature as well as in nature (2002, 49). Drees expresses a similar criticism by arguing that all contemporary explanations
of human agency, including non-reductionist explanations, are naturalistic and do not require any reference to a higher being. For panentheists to claim that divine agency is analogous to human agency fails both to recognize that human agency requires no additional source or cause and to explain how a divine source
of being could act in
the realm
of physical and mental processes (1999). Frankenberry makes this objection more specific. Panentheism offers a more complex relationship between God and
the world than is necessary. This unnecessary complexity is revealed by
the problems that panentheism has with
the logic
of the freedom
of parts in wholistic relations,
the possibility
of the body-soul analogy relapsing into gender inflected ideas
of the soul as
the male principle,
the problem with simultaneity
of events in
the divine experience in relation to
the principle
of the relativity
of time,
the necessity
of the everlasting nature
of value, and finally
the use
of the ontological argument to establish
the necessity
of the abstract pole
of the divine nature (1993, 36–39). Gillett points out that panentheism lacks an explanation for a causal efficacy higher than
the causal efficacy realized by microphysical causation (2003, 19). Generally, panentheists respond to these criticisms by affirming
the inadequacy both scientifically and metaphysically
of any type
of reductionistic naturalism. Such a naturalism whether articulated in scientific categories or religious categories fails to recognize
the emergence
of levels
of complexity in nature.
The emergence
of higher levels
of organization that cannot be completely explained in terms
of lower levels renders non-differentiated accounts
of being inadequate. Panentheists often argue that
the emergence
of higher levels
of order makes possible downward causation. Davies describes
the difficulties in coming to a clear description
of downward causation and concludes that
the complexity
of systems open to
the environment makes room for downward causation but has not yet provided an explanation
of how downward causation works (2006, 48).
The concepts
of entanglement and divine entanglement may offer new perspective on causation and especially
the role
of the divine in natural causation (Wegter–Mcnelly 2011).
Rather than criticizing an unnecessary transcendence, traditional theism charges panentheism with an inadequate transcendence due to failing to distinguish God from
the world. Grounds recognized that panentheists hold that God includes
the world but is not identical to
the world. Craig recognizes that Clayton claims that God is infinite. But Grounds describes Hartshorne's distinction between God and
the world as a distinction that is not consistently held because Hartshorne includes accidents within God's nature. Grounds argues that according to Hartshorne God would cease to be if
the world ceased to exist. Such a position lacks an adequate distinction between God and
the world since God and
the world are interdependent (Grounds, 1970, 154). Craig challenges
the understanding
of the term “infinite” within panentheistic thought by arguing that understanding
the infinite as including all reality in a monistic sense confuses
the definition
of “infinite” with identifying what is infinite (2006, 137). Even though Clayton seeks to retain a distinction between God and
the world, he fails to be consistent because he fails to recognize that “infinite” is an umbrella concept that captures all
the qualities that identify God as
the perfect being rather than identifying God as an absolutely unlimited reality (Craig 2006, 142–150). Rowe responds to Craig by arguing that Clayton would reject understanding
the distinction between God and
the world as requiring that
the world limits God by being distinct. Instead, distinct from God means having an essential property that God lacks or lacking an essential property that God has which agrees with Craig's notion
of the infinite as an umbrella concept (Rowe 2007, 67). Clayton describes
the infinite as present in finite minds although ungraspable (2008, 152). Vail finds that Keller's panentheism blurs
the line between
the cosmic and
the divine leading to a distinction
of degree rather than
of quality (2012, 164, 177).
The basic response
of panentheists to these criticisms that
the distinction between God and
the world cannot be maintained is a dipolar concept
of God. In a dipolar understanding
of God,
the essence
of God is different from
the world because God is infinite and
the world is finite; God is everlasting and
the world is temporal. Griffin additionally affirms
the numerical difference between God and
the world even though there is no ontological difference
of kind (2004, 44–45). Cooper recognizes that
the panentheist does actually describe a distinction between God and
the world but criticizes panentheism because it does not hold an unqualified ontological distinction between God and
the world. Only an ontological distinction between God and
the world makes it possible to identify and affirm God's saving presence. According to Cooper, if God's transcendence does not infinitely exceed God's immanence, God's presence, knowledge, and power are limited rather than complete, immediate, and unconditioned. Cooper recognizes that prioritizing divine transcendence raises
the problem
of evil but thinks that God's unlimited power provides hope that God will provide an ultimate solution to
the problem
of evil.
The basic issue for traditional theism is that panentheism understands a balance between transcendence and immanence to involve
the world influencing and affecting God. If God is affected by
the world, then God is considered incapable
of providing salvation (Cooper 2006, 322–328). Peacocke and Eastern Orthodox thinkers (Louth 2004, 184; Nesteruk 2004, 173–176; Ware 2004, 167) respond by affirming a weak form
of emergence in which
the world does not affect God. Clayton and Bracken respond by maintaining that
the world does influence God but God's will, expressed through
the decisions that God makes, protects God's ability to save (Clayton 2005). Moltmann describes God's essence as directing God's activity in order to maintain
the reliability
of God as love acting on behalf
of creation. Moltmann does not find it necessary to protect divine freedom by giving it priority over divine love but rather understands freedom as acting according to
the divine nature
of love (Moltmann 1981, 98, 99). Cooper also criticizes panentheism for holding a concept
of God that can save through
the general processes
of nature but not in any distinctive way. Vanhoozer's concern for divine freedom is based on a similar concern (1998, 250). But, Griffin's discussion
of divine variable action does allow for specific and distinctive manifestations
of divine love (2004, 45). Ultimately,
the panentheist response is that God's nature as love directs God's actions bringing salvation. God's nature as love is
the crucial aspect
of divine action rather than a causal efficacy.
The emphasis
of traditional theism on divine will misses that
the divine will is directed by divine love. Some responses by traditional theists have claimed that traditional theism is not guilty
of separating God from
the world and thus panentheism is not needed as a corrective (Carroll 2008, Finger 1997). Wildman acknowledges that traditional theism does hold that God has a meaningful presence in
the world but has an inadequate ontological basis for that presence. An adequate basis for
the active presence
of God int he world requires some role for
the world in
the constitution
of God (Wildman 2011, 186).
The varieties
of panentheism participate in internal criticism. Clayton (2008, 127) and Crain (2006) emphasize
the dependence
of the world upon God rather than
the dependence
of God upon
the world although they maintain that God is influenced, and changed, by
the world. They criticize understandings
of God that limit God by making God subject to metaphysical principles. Griffin emphasizes
the regularity provided by metaphysical principles. This regularity recognizes
the order in reality that
the reliability
of God's love provides. Panentheists also caution that
the emphasis upon
the ontological nature
of the relation between God and
the world can lead to a loss
of the integrity
of the world. Richardson warns against losing
the discrete identity
of finite beings in God (2010, 345). Case-Winters calls for maintaining a balance between
the distinction between God and
the world and God's involvement with
the world. Over–emphasis upon either side
of the balance leads to positions that are philosophically and theologically inadequate (Case–Winters 2007, 125).
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======================================================================================================
Enjoy!
Best regards,
Cosmotheist
PS--Many
of the false criticisms
of panentheism by atheists and pan-atheists and even
pantheists stem from not understanding that
the Whole is always greater than just
the
sum
of all
of the parts, and just as your own Whole self is, and is all known intrinsically.
